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Abstract
Conventional wisdom in the policy community holds that volatile ﬁscal transfers to
local governments will cause volatile local spending, due to policy myopia. I test the degree
to which local governments are forward-looking by exploiting unusual variation in inter-
governmental grants in Indonesia. A national reform permanently increased the general
grant, and the increase was larger for less densely populated districts. Hydrocarbon-rich
districts experienced transitory shocks to shared resource revenue. Districts responded to
the permanent revenue shock by increasing investment in lumpy public goods. By contrast,
districts smoothed their expenditure responses to the transitory revenue shocks, opting
not to adjust lumpy public goods. e results suggest that local governments respond to
changes in permanent public income over a time horizon of three to ﬁve years. I discuss
implications for countercyclical ﬁscal policy and research on taxation and accountability.
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1 Introduction
Large and unpredictable transfers of natural resource revenues can destabilize a local
economy. Cycles of boom and bust also harm economic growth, as governments are
likely to spend on ostentatious projects during booms and not plan appropriately for
downturns (Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2016, p. 11).
A common view in the policy community holds that local governments engage in short-
sighted policymaking. Under this view, volatile ﬁscal transfers to local governments, such as
shared natural resource revenue, will lead to volatile local expenditure, as politicians ramp up
spending when revenue rises but fail to anticipate the subsequent fall in revenue. As a result,
large projects started during boom years may never be ﬁnished, wasting public resources and
contributing to a local resource curse (Cust and Viale, 2016; van der Ploeg, 2011).
Are local governments really short-sighted, or do they correctly distinguish between
temporary and permanent changes in revenue when planning future expenditure? e optimal
design of intergovernmental grants will depend crucially on which view of government is
correct. In particular, if local governments are myopic, then central governments should
smooth revenue on behalf of local governments or go to great lengths to facilitate smoothing at
the local level. is would require a massive restructuring of intergovernmental grant systems
around the world—especially in the dozens of countries with derivation-based systems which
transfer a portion of natural resource revenue back to the region of origin.
is paper tests the degree to which local governments are forward-looking by exploiting
unusual policy variation in Indonesia. I examine local government responses to the country’s
two largest intergovernmental grants. e ﬁrst is a general grant that has stable disbursements
over time, with the exception of a single permanent increase due to a national reform. A change
in the allocation formula for the grant caused less densely populated districts to experience
larger permanent increases in the grant. e second grant is shared revenue from local oil and
gas production, which exhibits signiﬁcant transitory variation in hydrocarbon-rich areas.
e two grants provide a unique window into local policymaking. A government that
maximizes citizen welfare over a time horizon of several years will recognize that a permanent
one-dollar increase in the general grant has a larger impact on the intertemporal budget con-
straint than a transitory one-dollar increase in oil and gas revenue. Consequently, investments
in lumpy public goods, which must exceed a minimum threshold, will be more responsive
to permanent changes in revenue than to transitory changes. e expenditure response to
the general grant will be front-loaded due to these upfront investments. By contrast, the
government will smooth spending out of the oil and gas revenue, adjusting the provision of
non-lumpy public goods. A myopic government that only maximizes welfare in the current
period will be equally sensitive to the general grant and the oil and gas revenue, as it perceives
the permanent shock to be a series of transitory shocks.
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Exploiting the novel features of my empirical seing, I construct three tests of forward-
looking behavior. First, I test for diﬀerential time paths of expenditure in response to the two
grants. Second, I back out the government’s time horizon using the number of years it takes
to spend a one-dollar transitory increase in revenue. Finally, I test whether the grants have
diﬀerent eﬀects on lumpy public goods but similar eﬀects on non-lumpy items.
Consistent with the theory, the permanent shock to the general grant produced a front-
loaded expenditure response and led to greater provision of lumpy public goods and services,
such as public schools, health facilities, and health personnel. By contrast, transitory ﬂuctua-
tions in oil and gas revenue produced a smoothed expenditure response and had lile impact
on lumpy public goods and services. e two grants had similar eﬀects on road quality, which
depends on less lumpy maintenance expenditure, suggesting that lumpiness, rather than gra,
drives the diﬀerential responses of structures and personnel to the two grants.
e empirical results are consistent with local governments responding to changes in
permanent public income over a time horizon of three to ﬁve years. is conclusion contrasts
sharply with the commonly held view that local governments are myopic. e results are
especially surprising given that they are obtained in a low-income seing, in which local
governments oen face stronger political-economy forces and liquidity constraints—both of
which contribute to policy myopia.
Besides providing unique policy variation, the Indonesian seing oﬀers additional advan-
tages. First, there are a large number of local governments—over 300—with spending authority
similar to that of U.S. state governments. Second, national regulations deprive local govern-
ments of any control over income-tax or property-tax policy. is eliminates an important
margin of response to revenue shocks—tax cuts.1 When tax instruments are unavailable, the
local government’s time horizon approximately equals the time it takes for an additional dollar
of revenue to translate into an additional dollar of spending.
Despite Indonesia’s distinctive features, the results hold lessons for other countries, for
two reasons. First, many countries have intergovernmental grants that are similar to the ones
studied in this paper. Equalization grants like Indonesia’s general grant are used in countries
from all parts of the income distribution, including Canada, China, Germany, India, and the
United Kingdom. Natural resource revenue sharing likewise is popular and can be found in
over 30 countries, most of which are located in Latin America or Africa (Natural Resource
Governance Institute, 2016, p. 8).
Second, across the developing world, central governments have devolved greater spending
responsibilities to local governments without devolving revenue-collection responsibilities
to a similar degree, making intergovernmental grants especially important (Gadenne and
Singhal, 2014). e results show that inexperienced local governments can use their newfound
authority well by pursuing forward-looking policy.
is paper contributes to several related literatures in public ﬁnance and development.
1U.S. state governments cut taxes in response to increases in natural resource revenue (James, 2015).
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First, it is related to the literature on the so-called ﬂypaper eﬀect, the empirical regularity that
local governments have a greater propensity to spend out of non-matching grants than out of
local private income (Hines and aler, 1995; Inman, 2008). When testing for a ﬂypaper eﬀect,
researchers ask how much additional local spending results from increasing grants by one
dollar. Rarely do they distinguish between permanent and transitory increases in grants.2 I
build on this literature by showing that the permanence of a grant increase determines how
the additional spending is distributed over time. Knowing the timing of ﬁscal responses to
grants is important for conducting countercyclical ﬁscal policy in a federation.
Second, this paper builds on the literature that exploits exogenous variation in grant
allocations to estimate the causal eﬀects of grants. A key concern with the older literature is
that the distribution of funds likely depends on local preferences for public good provision, so
that the observed relationship between spending and grant revenue may not reﬂect the causal
eﬀect of grants (Knight, 2002). To avoid this problem, recent research has identiﬁed features
of intergovernmental grant policy that induce exogenous variation in grant allocations.3
Compared to most of these studies, I exploit relatively large exogenous shocks to grants: the
general grant reform permanently increased the grant by 46 percent on average and more than
doubled the grant for 16 percent of districts.
ird, an older literature examines whether the dynamic responses of local governments
to local revenue are consistent with intertemporal utility maximization over an inﬁnite hori-
zon (Holtz-Eakin and Rosen, 1991, 1993; Holtz-Eakin, Rosen, and Tilly, 1994; Dahlberg and
Lindstro¨m, 1998). Rather than testing the null hypothesis that governments are inﬁnitely
forward-looking, I directly infer the government’s time horizon from its ﬁscal responses to
grant revenue shocks.
Finally, this research is related to the development literature that examines whether inter-
governmental transfers actually improve conditions for their target populations. In some cases
signiﬁcant portions of targeted transfers have been captured by local politicians (Reinikka and
Svensson, 2004), while in others general-purpose transfers have led to wasteful spending, cor-
ruption, and at best modest improvements in public goods (Monteiro and Ferraz, 2012; Caselli
and Michaels, 2013; Brollo, Nannicini, Peroi, and Tabellini, 2013). Motivated by these results,
researchers have examined whether increases in local tax revenue lead to beer outcomes
than increases in transfers, due to an accountability channel (Borge, Parmer, and Torvik, 2015;
Gadenne, 2017; Martı´nez, 2017). is literature employs survey data on public goods, such as
the number of schools, that are relatively easy to measure and oen require lumpy investment.
My results highlight a novel methodological challenge facing this literature: if tax revenue is
more persistent than grant revenue, taxes will have a larger estimated impact on public goods,
even when the two revenue streams are subject to the same level of accountability.
2Two exceptions are Zou (1994) and Buener and Wildasin (2006).
3See, e.g., Gordon (2004), Baicker (2005), Dahlberg, Mo¨rk, Rasø, and A˚gren (2008), Lutz (2010), Litschig and
Morrison (2013), Gennari and Messina (2014), Lundqvist (2015), Dahlby and Ferede (2016), and Liu and Ma (2016).
4
e results of this paper are most similar to those of Besfamille, Jorrat, Manzano, and
Sanguinei (2019), who estimate the ﬁscal responses of provincial governments to two grants
in Argentina: shared federal tax revenue and shared oil and gas revenue. e authors ﬁnd
that provinces partially smooth expenditure out of both grants, but smoothing is greater in
response to the oil and gas revenue, which is more volatile. eir ﬁndings are thus consistent
with my results on ﬁscal outcomes.
e paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a model of public expenditure, Section 3
provides institutional background on Indonesia, Section 4 describes the data, Section 5 explains
the identiﬁcation strategy, Section 6 presents the empirical results, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Model
is section develops a simple model of public expenditure on durable and nondurable goods.
It is similar to the model of Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996, pp. 96–98), with three modiﬁcations.
First, the government’s time horizon is ﬁnite. is assumption could be justiﬁed on behavioral
grounds (district heads fail to consider outcomes in the distant future) or political grounds
(district heads are limited to two ﬁve-year terms and care only about citizen welfare while
in oﬃce). Second, investment in durables is lumpy. is assumption captures the fact that
publicly provided durable goods, such as schools or other structures, oen must satisfy a
minimum size requirement. ird, public spending is ﬁnanced solely by intergovernmental
grants. is assumption approximately holds in Indonesia, where district governments are
prohibited from imposing taxes on property or income.
Several testable implications emerge from the model. First, permanent and transitory
shocks to grant revenue produce diﬀerent responses in total expenditure. In particular, a one-
time, permanent increase in grant revenue by one dollar causes total expenditure to increase
by more than one dollar in the year of the shock, and less than one dollar in subsequent
years. By contrast, a one-time, transitory increase in grant revenue by one dollar increases
total expenditure by an equal amount, less than one dollar, in the year of the shock and
subsequent years. Second, the size of the spending response to the transitory revenue shock is
decreasing in the length of the government’s time horizon. ird, permanent and transitory
shocks to grant revenue have diﬀerent eﬀects on the composition of public expenditure. While
permanent shocks are likely to increase consumption of both durable and nondurable public
goods, transitory shocks are more likely to increase consumption of nondurable goods only.
e above results hold when durables investment is “lumpy enough.” When investment is not
lumpy, permanent and transitory revenue shocks have identical per-dollar eﬀects.
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2.1 e Environment
Suppose the local government provides a nondurable good, C , and a durable good, D. e
durable good evolves according to the equation of motion, Dt = (1 − δ )Dt−1 + It , where It
is current investment in the durable good and δ is the depreciation rate. Let pt denote the
price of durable-good investment in units of the nondurable good in period t . Investment
is “lumpy”: the government may choose any level of “maintenance” investment up to the
point of maintaining the entire durables stock from the previous period, but any increase in
the durables stock must exceed a minimum size threshold, I .4 Total government spending in
period t ,Gt , is the sum ofCt and pt It . e local government has access to a risk-free bond with
exogenous rate of return r . Federal grants are the local government’s only source of revenue.
Let At denote the government’s stock of net assets, and let Ft denote federal grant revenue in
period t . Assets evolve according to the equation of motion, At+1 = (1 + r )(At + Ft −Ct − pt It ).
2.2 e Government’s Problem
e local government acts as if it faces a ﬁnite time horizon of T periods, starting in period 0
and ending in period T − 1. e intertemporal budget constraint in starting period t is
T−1∑
t=0
Ct + pt It
(1 + r )t
≤ A0 +
T−1∑
t=0
Ft
(1 + r )t
.
e representative citizen has Cobb-Douglas preferences over durables and nondurables
consumption. is assumption rules out changes in expenditure shares due to changes in the
size of the budget, making it possible to study how the interaction between the lumpiness
constraint and the size of the revenue shock inﬂuences the composition of spending. Let
β ∈ (0, 1) denote the representative citizen’s discount factor. e government has perfect
foresight and maximizes the representative citizen’s utility over the ﬁnite time horizon,
T−1∑
t=0
βt
(
γ logCt + (1 − γ ) logDt
)
,
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint, the investment constraint, and the equation of
motion for durables.5 I assume that γ ∈ (0, 1) so that the citizen wants to consume both goods.
Assuming that the initial stock of durables, D−1, and the investment threshold, I , are both
small enough that the investment constraint does not bind, the necessary conditions for an
4Formally, the investment constraint is It ∈ [0, δDt−1] ∪ [δDt−1 + I ,∞), where I is the minimum size of
new structures. Note that the investment constraint rules out selling any portion of the durables stock. is
assumption is inconsequential if the initial stock of durables is small enough.
5e model abstracts from private consumption in order to focus aention on the government’s optimal
expenditure plan. As there is no taxation in the model, adding private consumption would not change any of the
results below as long as citizen preferences for private consumption and public consumption were separable.
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optimum yield the two Euler equations
Ct+1 = β(1 + r )Ct ,
γpt
Ct
=
1 − γ
Dt
+ β(1 − δ )
γpt+1
Ct+1
.
Combining the Euler equations yields the condition
(1 − γ )Ct
γDt
= pt −
1 − δ
1 + r
pt+1 ≡ ιt , (1)
which states that the marginal rate of substitution between nondurables consumption and
durables consumption equals the user cost of durables.
In order to simplify the dynamics of the solution, which will aid in the comparative statics
exercise below, I make a number of parametric assumptions. First, assume that the citizen’s
discount rate equals the interest rate (β = 1/(1 + r )), so that desired nondurables consumption
is constant over time. Next, assume that the price of investment is constant over time: pt = p,
hence ιt = p(r + δ )/(1+ r ) ≡ ι. e citizen thus will want to consume the durable good and the
nondurable good in constant proportion over time. Combining the ﬁrst two assumptions, the
citizen will desire a constant level of durables consumption over time. Finally, assume that the
depreciation rate is zero (δ = 0). Together, the assumptions imply that all durables investment
will occur in the ﬁrst period—investment in subsequent periods is unnecessary to maintain a
constant stock of durables, because there is no depreciation.6
Deﬁne permanent public income to be
Y P =
r
1 + r − (1 + r )1−T
(
A0 + pD−1 +
T−1∑
t=0
Ft
(1 + r )t
)
,
which is the constant resource ﬂow that can be sustained over the government’s time horizon
(Flavin, 1981). In this model permanent public income is a function of initial ﬁnancial wealth,
the resale value of the initial stock of durables, and the present discounted value of grant
revenue. e Euler equations, combined with the simplifying assumptions, imply thatCt+1 = Ct
and Dt = (γι)
−1(1 − γ )Ct . Substituting these two equations into the intertemporal budget
constraint yields
Ct = γ ·
1 + r − (1 + r )1−T
1 + r − γ (1 + r )1−T
· Y P , Dt =
1 − γ
ι
·
1 + r − (1 + r )1−T
1 + r − γ (1 + r )1−T
· Y P
for t ∈ {0, . . . ,T − 1}. us durables and nondurables consumption are both constant fractions
of permanent public income over the time horizon.
6Positive depreciation could be incorporated into the model without changing the qualitative nature of the
results, as long as δ were small enough. With positive depreciation, investment in periods 2 and later would be
positive, yet smaller than investment in period 1.
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2.3 Response to a Permanent Revenue Shock
Now consider how the government responds to two diﬀerent revenue shocks, starting from
the interior optimum described above. e permanent shock raises revenue by one dollar in
every period, while the transitory shock raises revenue by one dollar in the ﬁrst period only.
us I hold ﬁxed the period-0 value of the shock while varying its present discounted value.
First consider a permanent increase in grant revenue by one unit: dFt = 1 for t ∈ {0, . . . ,T −
1}. Permanent public income increases by one unit: dY P = 1. Assuming the revenue increase
is large enough to push the government to a new interior optimum with positive investment
in period 0, the consumption response to the permanent revenue shock is given by
dCPermt = γ ·
1 + r − (1 + r )1−T
1 + r − γ (1 + r )1−T
, dDPermt =
1 − γ
ι
·
1 + r − (1 + r )1−T
1 + r − γ (1 + r )1−T
for t ∈ {0, . . . ,T − 1}. Durables and nondurables consumption immediately increase in period
0 and remain ﬁxed at their new levels for the remainder of the time horizon. Because the
initial stock of durables, D−1, is predetermined and I0 = D0 −D−1, period 0 investment rises by
dI0
Perm
= dDPerm0 . erefore the response of total public expenditure in period 0 is
dGPerm0 = dC
Perm
0 + pdI
Perm
0 =
1 + r − γ
r
·
1 + r − (1 + r )1−T
1 + r − γ (1 + r )1−T
.
us when there are at least two time periods, total expenditure increases in the ﬁrst period
by more than the increase in permanent income (dGPerm0 > 1) due to the increase in upfront
investment in durables. Because the revenue increase leaves investment unchanged in the
ensuing periods,
dGPermt = dC
Perm
t = dC
Perm
0 < 1
for t ∈ {1, . . . ,T − 1}.
To summarize, an increase in permanent grant revenue by one unit in period 0 increases
public expenditure by more than one unit in period 0 and less than one unit in periods 1 through
T − 1. e total expenditure response is thus “front loaded.” Both durables and nondurables
consumption increase in response to the permanent one-unit increase in grant revenue.
2.4 Response to a Transitory Revenue Shock
Next consider a temporary increase in grant revenue by one unit in period 0: dF0 = 1, and
dFt = 0 for t ∈ {1, . . . ,T − 1}. Assuming there are at least two time periods, the increase in
permanent revenue, dY P = r/
(
1 + r − (1 + r )1−T
)
, is less than one and is decreasing in the
length of the time horizon,T . ree responses are possible depending on the parameter values.
Case 1. I ≤
1−γ
ι
· r
1+r−γ (1+r )1−T
.
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In the ﬁrst case the investment constraint does not bind, because the increase in durables
consumption that the government would choose in the absence of the investment constraint,
dD
Temp
t = dD
Perm
t · dY
P , exceeds I . e government adjusts durables and nondurables con-
sumption to a new interior solution, so dC
Temp
t = dC
Perm
t · dY
P and dG
Temp
t = dG
Perm
t · dY
P for
t ∈ {0, . . . ,T − 1}. e spending response per unit of additional revenue is identical to the case
of the permanent revenue shock.
Case 2.
1−γ
ι
· r
1+r−γ (1+r )1−T
< I ≤ I˜ , where I˜ satisﬁes
γ log
(
C−1 + dY
P (1 − pI˜ )
)
+ (1 − γ ) log(D−1 + I˜ ) = γ log(C−1 + dY
P ) + (1 − γ ) logD−1,
and C−1 and D−1 are the pre-shock levels of nondurables and durables consumption, respectively.
In the second case the investment constraint binds, yet I is small enough that the govern-
ment chooses strictly positive investment in durables, seing I0 = I . e representative citizen
is indiﬀerent between (i) investing I˜ in durables and adjusting nondurables consumption to
satisfy the lifetime budget constraint, and (ii) seing investment equal to zero and spending
the entire revenue increase on nondurables consumption. For I less than I˜ , the citizen would
prefer a positive level of investment in durables.
Case 3. I > I˜ , where I˜ is deﬁned as in Case 2.
In the ﬁnal case the investment constraint binds, and investment is zero. e minimum size
requirement, I , is high enough that the citizen would rather spend the entire revenue increase
on nondurables rather than invest at least I in durables. In this case dG
Temp
t = dC
Temp
t = dY
P
t
and dD
Temp
t = 0 for t ∈ {0, . . . ,T − 1}.
To summarize, a transitory increase in grant revenue by one unit could lead to three possible
outcomes. If the minimum investment size, I , is small enough, the government will increase
consumption of both durables and nondurables in proportion with the change in permanent
income. In this case the per-dollar eﬀects of permanent and transitory revenue shocks will be
the same. For slightly larger values of I , the government will invest the minimum required
amount and adjust nondurables consumption to balance the budget. If the minimum size is large
enough, the government will spend the entire revenue increase on nondurables consumption.
Compared to a permanent revenue shock, a transitory revenue shock will produce a response
skewed toward nondurables consumption if the minimum size of nondurables investment is
large enough. In this case the total spending response evenly spreads the extra revenue across
the time horizon.
2.5 Extensions
e model makes several simplifying assumptions for the purpose of tractability. e appendix
discusses how the results might be altered by incorporating supply bolenecks, liquidity
constraints, or uncertainty into the model.
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An important omission from the model is bureaucratic delay. Red tape may prevent local
governments from immediately responding to grant revenue shocks. District governments in
Indonesia oen receive grant funds late in the ﬁscal year, face signiﬁcant delays in the process
of geing budgets approved by the provincial authorities, and have diﬃculty procuring goods
and services in a timely manner. Administrative bolenecks imply that the ﬁscal responses
predicted by the model may occur with a lag.
2.6 Econometric Predictions
To aid in the interpretation of the regression estimates, it is helpful to map the predictions of
the theoretical model to the parameters of a linear econometric model. Consider the equation
Gdt =
K∑
k=0
βkFd,t−k +
K∑
k=0
δkHd,t−k +Udt ,
where Gdt is total expenditure, Fdt is grant revenue subject to permanent shocks, and Hdt
is grant revenue subject to transitory shocks, all in per-capita terms, for district d in year
t . Suppose that K ≥ T − 1, so that the lag structure of the regression captures the district
government’s response over the entire time horizon. A permanent increase in F by one unit
raises spending ℓ years later by
∑ℓ
k=0 βk , while a transitory increase in H by one unit raises
spending ℓ years later by δℓ. e sum
∑ℓ
k=0 δk gives how much of the one-unit transitory
increase in H is spent from the year of the shock to ℓ years aer the shock. e cumulative
spending responses,
∑ℓ
k=0 βk and
∑ℓ
k=0 δk , thus summarize how much spending each grant
stimulated, as well as the timing of that spending.
First consider a permanent shock to F . e theoretical model predicts that β0 = dG
Perm
0 > 1
and
∑ℓ
k=0 βk = dG
Perm
1 < 1 for ℓ ≥ 1. at is, there is a large initial spending response due to
upfront investments in lumpy goods, followed by a smaller response composed of spending
on non-lumpy items. As discussed in the previous section, red tape associated with geing
investment projects approved may delay the initial investment response relative to the desired
path of spending. We therefore focus on two qualitative predictions of the model: (1) the
cumulative spending response to F will, at some point, exceed unity (
∑ℓ
k=0 βk > 1 for some
ℓ), and (2) the cumulative spending response to F will eventually fall (
∑ℓ+1
k=0 βk <
∑ℓ
k=0 βk for
some ℓ).
Now consider a transitory shock to H under the assumption that Case 3 holds, i.e., the
government only adjusts spending on nondurables. eory predicts that δk = dG
Temp
0 < 1 for
k ∈ {0, . . . ,K} and δk = 0 for k > K . emodel therefore makes two qualitative predictions: (1)
the cumulative spending response to H will never exceed unity (
∑ℓ
k=0 δk ≤ 1 for all ℓ), and (2)
the cumulative spending response toH will be weakly monotonic over time (
∑ℓ
k=0 δk ≤
∑ℓ+1
k=0 δk
for all ℓ).
Finally, the theory predicts that nondurables consumption will increase more in response
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to a permanent increase in F than it will to a transitory increase in H . e diﬀerential response
to permanent and transitory revenue shocks is especially likely to appear in measures of
long-lived structures, such as schools and health facilities. We test the above predictions ahead.
3 Institutional Background
3.1 Decentralization in Indonesia
e resignation of Suharto as president of Indonesia in 1998 marked the end of three decades
of highly centralized authoritarian rule and paved the way for dramatic political and economic
reforms. Indonesia now ranks as one of the most decentralized countries in the developing
world (Shah, Qibthiyyah, and Dita, 2012). ere are three levels of subnational government in
Indonesia: province, district, and village. Indonesia currently has 34 provinces. e number
of districts has grown from 336 in 2001 to 514 in 2014, due to district spliing. (See Fitrani,
Hofman, and Kaiser, 2005; Burgess, Hansen, Olken, Potapov, and Sieber, 2012; Bazzi and
Gudgeon, 2018, for details.) Districts are categorized as either rural districts (kabupaten) or
municipalities (kota). Expenditure responsibilities are the same for both types of district.
e “Big Bang” ﬁscal decentralization reforms of 2001 devolved vast expenditure authority
to provincial and (especially) district governments (World Bank, 2003). e share of total
expenditures managed by subnational governments rose from 24 percent in the mid-1990s
to 36 percent in 2011, with district governments accounting for most subnational spending.
Indonesia’s level of expenditure decentralization exceeds the OECD average and is higher than
every East Asian country except China (World Bank, 2007). However, own-source revenue
accounts for only nine percent of total subnational revenue, necessitating large ﬁscal transfers
from the central government (World Bank, 2007; Shah et al., 2012). Own-source revenue mostly
consists of business license fees, hotel and restaurant taxes, and utility fees. Districts are
prohibited from introducing income or property taxes (World Bank, 2007).
Following decentralization, subnational borrowing has been minimal, for three reasons.
First, the central government has banned foreign borrowing by districts and must pre-approve
domestic borrowing (Blo¨ndal, Hawkesworth, and Choi, 2009). Second, many district govern-
ments have poor credit ratings. Finally, district governments have had diﬃculty spending all of
their transfer revenue in a timely fashion, leading to a buildup of reserves (World Bank, 2007,
p. 127–128). Current revenue and reserves typically suﬃce to ﬁnance large capital projects.
Districts deposit their considerable savings in (domestic) commercial banks and typically do not
invest in central government certiﬁcates of deposit (SBI) or treasuries (Lewis and Oosterman,
2009).
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3.2 General Grant
e largest source of ﬁnancing for most district governments is a federal grant known as the
General Allocation Fund (Dana Alokasi Umum), or “general grant” for short, which accounts
for around 56 percent of district revenue. e general grant is an equalization grant, intended
to equalize the capacity to provide local public goods across regions. Equalization grants have
the potential to promote equity by targeting areas populated by households with low earning
potential. In real-world contexts, such as in Canada, such grants oen distort household
location decisions and fall short of equity goals (Albouy, 2012). Researchers and policymakers
have argued that Indonesia’s general grant is insuﬃciently equalizing and promotes ineﬃcient
spending on the civil service wage bill (Hofman, Kadjatmiko, Kaiser, and Sjahrir, 2006; World
Bank, 2007).
Districts have complete discretion over how to spend the general grant. e total budget
for the grant depends on long-term forecasts of factors determining the central government’s
budget health, such as the price of oil (World Bank, 2007). e allocation formula has two
components: the basic allocation and the ﬁscal gap. e basic allocation consists of a lump-sum
portion and a portion that is a function of the civil service wage bill. e ﬁscal gap is calculated
as the diﬀerence between expenditure needs and ﬁscal capacity. e formula for the general
grant is
General Grant = Basic Allocation + Expenditure Needs − Fiscal Capacity.
Expenditure needs are calculated as a weighted sum of indices related to population, land area,
poverty, and cost of construction. Section 5 discusses the expenditure-needs formula in greater
detail.
Since 2002, ﬁscal capacity has been deﬁned as the weighted sum of imputed own-source
revenue, shared tax revenue, and shared natural resource revenue:
Fiscal Capacity = a · (Imputed Own-Source Revenue) + b · (Shared Tax Revenue)
+ c · (Shared Natural Resource Revenue).
Own-source revenue is imputed based on a regression of actual own-source revenue on regional
GDP (World Bank, 2007). From 2002 to 2011, the value of a has varied between 0.5 and 1, b
has varied between 0.73 and 1, and c has varied between 0.5 and 1. e ﬁscal gap component
accounts for around half of the general grant budget.
e general grant allocation is determined on a yearly basis. For the ﬁrst two-thirds of the
sample period, general grant disbursements followed a “hold-harmless” rule which ensured
that general grant receipts would not fall below the previous year’s receipts. e hold-harmless
rule froze the general grant amount for many resource-rich districts which otherwise would
have received much lower disbursements according to the formula (World Bank, 2007, p. 121).
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3.3 Shared Oil and Gas Revenue
Districts containing natural resources receive Shared Natural Resource Revenue (Sumber Daya
Alam), which depends on the revenue collected from resource production that occurs in the
district and province. Oil and natural gas are by far the largest sources of natural resource
revenue in Indonesia. Figure A.1 in the appendix shows that Indonesia’s oil production peaked
in the early 1980s and has steadily declined since 1991. Gas production was roughly zero
until 1977, when it began steadily increasing. Over the sample period, oil production steadily
declined while gas production slightly increased, albeit with signiﬁcant transitory variation.
e oil price increased by about 87 percent and the gas price fell by about 50 percent, and both
prices exhibited signiﬁcant volatility. Consequently, the value of oil production increased, and
the value of gas production decreased, over the sample period.
According to the sharing rule, 15.5 percent of oil revenue collected within a district is
redistributed to subnational governments: 3.1 percent goes to the provincial government, 6.2
percent goes to the producing district, and the remaining 6.2 percent is evenly divided among
the other districts located in the same province. e sharing rule for natural gas is more
generous to subnational governments: 6.1 percent goes to the provincial government, 12.2
percent goes to the producing district, and another 12.2 percent is divided equally among the
other districts in the province. Despite the less generous sharing rule, shared oil revenue on
average exceeds shared gas revenue due to the higher value of oil production. Disbursements
are to be made on a quarterly basis (Law No. 33/2004), though in practice the transfers oen
arrive late in the ﬁscal year (World Bank, 2007, p. 128). Districts have complete discretion over
how to spend the shared oil and gas revenue.7
Both the general grant and shared oil and gas revenue are unconditional, non-matching,
and subject to the same level of central-government oversight. Hence, they diﬀer only in their
time-series variation.
3.4 Political Institutions
e post-Suharto reforms included signiﬁcant political decentralization. Starting in 1999,
local parliaments were democratically elected through a proportional representation system.
e district heads (“mayors”) previously appointed by Suharto were allowed to ﬁnish their
ﬁve-year terms, aer which time each local parliament appointed a new district head. e
political system was reformed yet again with the introduction of direct elections for district
heads starting in 2005. Incumbent mayors were allowed to ﬁnish their terms before direct
elections were held. For idiosyncratic reasons, terms of Suharto mayors expired in diﬀerent
7In 2009 the central government slightly increased the amount of oil and gas revenue shared with subnational
governments, earmarking this additional revenue for education (Law No. 33/2004). As a result, aer 2009 around
three percent of the district’s oil grant, and two percent of the district’s gas grant, was earmarked. is earmarking
is unlikely to play any role in district spending decisions, as earmarked funds are extremely small relative to total
education spending, which represents one third of the district budget on average.
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years, so that the terms of indirectly appointed mayors also expired at diﬀerent times. As a
result, direct elections were introduced in a staggered manner with exogenously determined
timing (Skouﬁas, Narayan, Dasgupta, and Kaiser, 2014).
4 Data
Each year district mayors are required to report on the district’s ﬁnances to the Ministry of
Finance (Kementerian Keuangan). Data on federal grants come from reports by the Ministry of
Finance.8 Data on other revenue sources, as well as expenditure disaggregated by economic
classiﬁcation and function, come from the Ministry of Finance and the World Bank’s Indonesia
Database for Policy and Economic Research (INDO-DAPOER).9 INDO-DAPOER provides data
on revenue and expenditure broken down by economic classiﬁcation up to either 2012 or 2013,
depending on the variable. I add data from 2013–2014 using budget reports from the Ministry
of Finance. I also replace missing or obviously incorrect values in INDO-DAPOER using the
Ministry of Finance data. Expenditure by function is available from INDO-DAPOER through
2012.10 e ﬁnal dataset includes grant revenue, other sources of revenue, and expenditure by
economic classiﬁcation for the years 2001–2014, and expenditure by function for the years
2001–2012. All ﬁscal variables are measured in constant 2010 IDR 1 million (approximately
USD 100) per capita.
INDO-DAPOER also provides information on district characteristics, such as land area
and population. Data on public good provision come from the Village Potential Statistics
(Pendataan Potensi Desa, or PODES) survey waves of 2000, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2011, and 2014.
e surveys act as a village census and thus are meant to cover every village.11 Data on oil
and gas reserves come from the proprietary UCube database maintained by Rystad Energy
(2016), an international oil and gas consulting company.12
To ensure that all districts in the sample operate under comparable institutional seings,
I omit provinces that have a special administrative or ﬁscal arrangement with the central
government.13 Of the remaining districts, only those that existed as of 2005 or earlier are
included in the sample. is restriction is necessary because the identiﬁcation strategy exploits
a policy reform in 2006. e ﬁnal sample for the analysis of public ﬁnance outcomes includes
372 districts from 29 provinces.
8e reports are available at hp://www.djpk.depkeu.go.id/.
9INDO-DAPOER is located at hp://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=1266.
10Some data on expenditure by function in 2013 and 2014 are available from INDO-DAPOER for a limited set
of districts, however I omit these years to avoid bias due to selective arition.
11Due to a massive tsunami in 2004, the 2005 wave lacks data on districts on the island of Nias (Nias, Nias
Utara, Nias Barat, Nias Selatan, and Gunung Sitoli).
12For details on the UCube database, see hps://www.rystadenergy.com/Products/EnP-Solutions/UCube.
13ese provinces are DI Yogyakarta, which has special autonomy status; DKI Jakarta, whose districts are
managed by the province; Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, which has special autonomy status and receives special
autonomy funds; and Papua and Papua Barat, which both receive special autonomy funds.
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e analysis of village-level public good outcomes is based on a balanced panel of over
41,000 villages matched across the PODES waves and located within the same 372 districts and
29 provinces included in the public ﬁnance sample. e sample excludes villages with data
that appear miscoded or indicate an incorrect merge.14 Around one quarter of villages split
into multiple villages over the period 2000–2014. To maintain a consistent unit of observation
in the public goods sample, I aggregate village outcomes up to 2000 borders. e sample
excludes villages that were involved in an amalgamation during the sample period (roughly
three percent of villages).
5 Identiﬁcation Strategy
I ﬁrst consider ﬁscal responses to the general grant and shared oil and gas revenue. e
structural equation for ﬁscal outcome Y is
Ydit =
K∑
k=0
βkGenGrantdi,t−k +
K∑
k=0
δkOilGasRevdi,t−k + αd + λit + εdit , (2)
where d indexes districts, i indexes islands, and t indexes years. e model allows for district
ﬁxed eﬀects, αd , and island × year eﬀects, λit .
15 I report standard errors that are robust to
heteroskedasticity and two-way clustering at the district and province × year levels to account
for within-district serial correlation and cross-district correlation within the same province
and year (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller, 2011). e within-district correlation is due to the
persistence of district-speciﬁc grant shocks and unobserved shocks over time. e cross-district
correlation arises from the fact that, in any given year, non-producing districts located in the
same province receive the same amount of oil and gas revenue.
As discussed in Section 2.6, the hypothesis that the general grant induces a front-loaded
expenditure response can be summarized by two conditions: (1)
∑ℓ
k=0 βk > 1 for some ℓ, and
(2)
∑ℓ+1
k=0 βk <
∑ℓ
k=0 βk for some ℓ. Likewise, the hypothesis that the oil and gas revenue causes
a smoothed ﬁscal response can be summarized by two conditions: (1)
∑ℓ
k=0 δk ≤ 1 for all ℓ, and
(2)
∑ℓ
k=0 δk ≤
∑ℓ+1
k=0 δk for all ℓ.
Next I consider the eﬀects of the two grants on local public goods and services. e
structural equation for village outcome Y is
Yvdis = β GenGrantdis + δ OilGasRevdis + αd + λis + εvdis, (3)
14First, I drop villages with reported annual population growth of more than 25 percent or less than −25 percent
in any time period. Second, I drop villages with reported population growth of at least 10 percent followed
immediately by a population decline of at least 10 percent, or vice versa. Finally, I drop villages with implausibly
large changes in public goods from one survey year to the next. To minimize the inﬂuence of outliers, I also drop
villages with population below the 2nd percentile or above the 98th percentile in any year.
15Following the Indonesian Statistical Bureau, I code seven island groups: Sumatra, Java, Nusa Tenggara,
Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku, and Papua.
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where v indexes villages and s indexes time periods spanned by the PODES survey years.
e variable GenGrantdis is the average annual general grant revenue during period s , and
OilGasRevdis is deﬁned similarly. e outcome Yvdis is a ﬂow variable, such as the number of
doctors per capita employed at the end of period s , or the average annual change in the stock
of health clinics per capita over period s . For period s starting in year t0 and ending in year
t1, the average annual general grant revenue and the average annual change in the stock of
health clinics per capita are calculated as
GenGrantdis =
1
t1 − t0
t1∑
t=t0+1
GenGrantdit , Yvdis =
1
t1 − t0
(Hvdit1 − Hvdit0),
where Hvdit is the stock of health clinics per capita in year t .
16 e regressions use as many
time periods as possible, subject to the availability of data on the outcomes. e theoretical
predictions are β > δ for lumpy public goods and β = δ for non-lumpy public goods.
Both ﬁscal transfers could be endogenous in equations (2) and (3). e general grant is
likely endogenous because it is a function of the civil service wage bill and ﬁscal need. Shared
oil and gas revenue is potentially less problematic, but it could be endogenous if oil and gas
production is aﬀected by the local business environment, local economic shocks, conﬂict, or
other unobservables that also aﬀect district public-good outcomes. Furthermore, deviations of
the two grants from the allocations prescribed by their respective formulas could reﬂect the
relative political bargaining power of the district, introducing another source of endogeneity.
In order to consistently estimate the coeﬃcients of interest, I exploit sources of exogenous
variation in the grants, explained below.
5.1 General Grant
To estimate the eﬀect of the general grant, I exploit variation induced by a large policy reform.
e central government of Indonesia considers forecasts of its long-run budget health in
determining how much money to allocate to the general grant. A key parameter in these
forecasts is the assumption about the future price of oil. In 2006 the total general grant budget
increased by 44 percent aer the central government adjusted the oil price assumption from
USD 30 per barrel to USD 60 per barrel (Agustina, Ahmad, Nugroho, and Siagian, 2012). e
central government also adjusted the formula for expenditure needs in 2006, resulting in a larger
share of the general grant budget going to less densely populated districts. us while most
districts saw an increase in general grant revenue in 2006, the least densely populated districts
saw the largest increases. Districts rich in oil and gas resources should have experienced a
decline in general grant funds according to the formula. However, a hold-harmless provision
froze the general grant allocation in place for these resource-abundant districts.
16Note that 1
t1−t0
(Hvdit1 − Hvdit0 ) =
1
t1−t0
∑t1
t=t0+1
(Hvdi ,t − Hvdi ,t−1), the average annual change in Hvdit from
t0 to t1.
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Formally, the change in general grant revenue per capita received by district d from 2005
to 2006 is given by
GenGrantdi,2006 −GenGrantdi,2005 ≈ θ + πAreaPC06di × NonOilGasdi + Remainderdi,
where π > 0, AreaPC06 is land area per capita in 2006, and Remainderdi is much smaller than
πAreaPC06di in absolute magnitude (World Bank, 2007). e indicator variable NonOilGasdi
equals one for districts not located in a province with signiﬁcant oil and gas endowments,
and zero otherwise.17 is variable captures the fact that the reform was binding only for
districts that did not have signiﬁcant resource revenue. See the appendix for more details on
the general grant formula and a derivation of the above approximation.
Changes to the general grant in the pre-reform period (2001–2005) and post-reform period
(2007–2014) were modest. As a result, general grant revenue per capita in district d and year t
can be approximated as
GenGrantdit ≈ θ + πAreaPC06di × NonOilGasdi × 1(t ≥ 2006) + Remainderdit ,
where 1(t ≥ 2006) equals one in years 2006 and later, and zero in years prior to 2006. Both
the increase in the total budget for the general grant and the change in the allocation formula
were announced in 2004 (Law No. 33/2004).
Figure 1 graphs average general grant revenue per capita over time separately for three
groups of districts divided according to area per capita in 2006. Panel (a) includes districts
located in provinces with an insigniﬁcant oil and gas endowment per capita, while Panel (b)
includes districts located in the six provinces with highly signiﬁcant oil and gas endowments
per capita. In each ﬁgure, average general grant revenue per capita for districts exceeding the
75th percentile in land area per capita (among all districts) is shown with a solid blue line. e
green long dashes apply to districts between the 50th and 75th percentiles in land area per
capita, while yellow short dashes indicate districts below the 50th percentile and land area per
capita. From 2001–2005, districts with greater area per capita received a larger general grant
allocation in per capita terms. Over this period, both the level of general grant per capita in
each group as well as the diﬀerences in general grant allocations between groups remained
approximately constant over time. Starting in 2006, districts in resource-poor provinces with
below-50th percentile land area per capita experienced only a small increase in general grant
per capita. By contrast, districts in the third quarter of the distribution saw a moderate increase
in general grant per capita, and districts in the top quarter experienced a massive increase
in general grant per capita. e relative distribution of general grant revenue per capita by
17In the sample the oil-and-gas-rich provinces are Riau, Kepulauan Riau, Jambi, Sumatera Selatan, Kalimantan
Timur, and Kalimantan Utara. See Figure A.2 in the appendix for the distribution of oil and gas revenue and
endowments per capita across provinces. Note that while Kalimantan Utara was oﬃcially formed in 2012, as
of 2014 its districts received shared oil and gas revenue as if they were still part of their former province of
Kalimantan Timur. e appendix ﬁgures therefore combine the two provinces.
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land area did not change much over time in provinces rich in oil and gas resources. e policy
reform of 2006 thus provides signiﬁcant cross-district variation in the size of a permanent
shock to the general grant within provinces that lack signiﬁcant oil and gas resources.
Figure 1 establishes that, in provinces with insigniﬁcant oil and gas resources, districts with
greater land area per capita experienced a larger increase in general grant revenue per capita
starting in 2006 than more densely populated districts. Consequently, the interaction term
AreaPC06di × NonOilGasdi × 1(t ≥ 2006) is a relevant instrument for general grant revenue
per capita that summarizes the variation due to the reform in the most parsimonious way
possible.
Because district population growth is relatively slow, land area per capita is approximately
time invariant.18 erefore, the ﬁxed-eﬀects model allows for the possibility that the level
of outcomes, such as spending or public goods, could depend on land area per capita. e
exclusion restriction requires only that the direct eﬀect of land area per capita on district
outcomes be the same on average in the periods 2001–2005 and 2006–2014. Intuitively, this
means that outcomes in districts with diﬀerent levels of population density would have followed
parallel paths over time in the absence of the general grant reform.
Even if the relationship between land area per capita and local preferences for spending
were time-invariant, one may worry that the timing or overall size of the reform could be
endogenous to the political or economic demands of less densely populated districts in resource-
poor provinces. For example, members of the national legislature representing less densely
populated districts may have pushed for the reform in order to help their own reelection
prospects or the prospects of incumbents in the district legislatures. e timing of the reform is
inconsistent with this story, however, as elections for both the national and district legislatures
took place in 1999, 2004, 2009, and 2014. at is, the reform took eﬀect three years prior to
the next legislative elections, casting doubt on the claim that the timing of the reform was the
result of political calculus.
Alternatively, members of the national legislature may have wanted to improve the re-
election prospects of incumbent mayors in less densely populated districts. If this were the
case, then one would expect to see a disproportionate number of mayoral elections taking
place in less densely populated districts in resource-poor provinces in 2006. In reality, among
resource-poor provinces, the average land area per capita of districts with mayoral elections in
2005 is statistically indistinguishable from the average land area per capita of districts with
mayoral elections in 2006, 2007, or 2008.19 us, there is lile reason to believe that the timing
or overall size of the general grant reform were motivated by political considerations.
18Median annual population growth is 1.4 percent.
19Results available upon request.
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5.2 Shared Oil and Gas Revenue
For the purpose of natural resource revenue sharing, district territory includes sea territory
that extends up to four nautical miles from the coastal shoreline (Law 22/1999). Government
revenue collected from oil production within a district is divided as follows: 84.5 percent
goes to the central government, 3.1 percent goes to the provincial government, 6.2 percent
goes to the producing district, and the remaining 6.2 percent is divided equally among the
non-producing districts located in the same province as the producing districts. Government
revenue collected from gas production within a district is divided as follows: 69.5 percent
goes to the central government, 6.1 percent goes to the provincial government, 12.2 percent
goes to the producing district, and the remaining 12.2 percent is divided equally among the
non-producing districts located in the same province as the producing districts.
Let Odpt and Gdpt denote oil and gas revenues produced in district d , located in province p,
in year t . Shared oil and gas revenue per capita is
OilGasRevdpt =
1
Popdpt
©­«0.062 ·Odpt + 0.122 ·Gdpt + 0.062Npt − 1
∑
j,d
Ojpt +
0.122
Npt − 1
∑
j,d
Gjpt
ª®¬ ,
where Popdpt is the population of district d in year t , and Npt is the number of districts
in province p in year t . Using the Rystad UCube database, I calculate the total amount of
economically recoverable oil and gas resources as of 2000 (and known in 2000), prior to ﬁscal
decentralization. I denote these measures as EndowOil
dt
and EndowGas
dt
. e only reason the
endowment measures could vary over time is because district borders sometimes change.20
Using the sharing rule, I deﬁne the variable
EndowPCdpt =
1
Popdpt
(
0.062 · EndowOildpt + 0.122 · Endow
Gas
dpt +
0.062
Npt − 1
∑
j,d
EndowOiljpt +
0.122
Npt − 1
∑
j,d
EndowGasjpt
)
,
which represents oil and gas endowment per capita to which district d has a claim for revenue-
sharing purposes.
Despite the formula established by law, the time variation in central government disburse-
ments of shared oil and gas revenue does not match the time variation in the value of resource
production. Panel (a) of Figure 2 graphs total oil and gas revenue shared with the districts
against the weighted value of oil and gas production, where the value of oil production is
given a weight of 0.062 and the value of gas production is given a weight of 0.122 as per the
sharing formula. e weighted value of production should be roughly proportional to the
20Fitrani et al. (2005) ﬁnd no consistent relationship between natural resources and the likelihood of a district
split from 1998–2004.
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central government’s revenue base from oil and gas production. e two time series do not
closely track each other, indicating that the central government frequently deviates from the
revenue-sharing rule on a discretionary basis.21
e distribution of oil and gas revenue is highly skewed, with only six provinces—Jambi,
Sumatera Selatan, Riau, Kepulauan Riau, Kalimantan Timur, and Kalimantan Utara—receiving
signiﬁcant amounts of revenue. (See the appendix.) Panel (b) of Figure 2 graphs average oil and
gas revenue separately for districts in the top ﬁve percent in terms of oil and gas endowment,
districts between the 90th and 95th percentiles, and districts in the boom 90 percent. Oil
and gas revenue is signiﬁcant only for the top 10 percent of districts in terms of endowment.
Furthermore, districts in the top ﬁve percent in terms of endowment experience very sharp
increases and decreases in oil and gas revenue from one year to the next. Cross-district
variation in resource endowments, combined with variation in aggregate shared oil and gas
revenue over time, provide exogenous variation in the size and timing of transitory shocks to
oil and gas revenue. Accordingly, I construct an instrument for oil and gas revenue per capita
by interacting aggregate shared oil and gas revenue (excluding own district revenue) with
predetermined oil and gas endowment per capita in 2000, AддOilGasRev(−d)t × EndowPCdit .
22
e validity of the instrument rests on the assumption that there are no omied factors that
covary with aggregate shared oil and gas revenue over time and diﬀerentially aﬀect districts
according to their oil and gas endowment. One concern is that beer-managed districts may
aract more oil and gas exploration, which in turn increases known endowment (Cust and
Harding, 2017; Cassidy, 2018; Arezki, van der Ploeg, and Toscani, 2019). e instrument avoids
contamination along these lines by measuring endowment known as of 2000, prior to ﬁscal
decentralization. Before the decentralization reforms, the central government was the sole
actor in negotiating with oil and gas companies. As a result, incentives to explore for oil and
gas were roughly uniform across the archipelago prior to 2001.23 It is therefore plausible that
the predetermined endowment is uncorrelated with the unobserved quality of governance.
A second concern is that district-level oil and gas production may be correlated with the
instrument, leading to estimates that conﬂate the eﬀects of production and shared revenue.
However, aggregate shared oil and gas revenue is not synchronized with aggregate oil and
gas production—or its lags—over time. (See Figure 2.) As already mentioned, the central
government apparently deviates from the revenue-sharing rule on a discretionary basis. Indeed,
the largest shock to shared oil and gas revenue occurred in 2006, the same year the central
government made large changes to its grant budget in response to an upwardly revised oil
21Lags of weighted oil and gas production also do not closely track total shared oil and gas revenue.
22Excluding own district oil and gas revenue from the calculation of aggregate shared oil and gas revenue
avoids a potential source of bias in the event that district oil and gas revenue is endogenous. Including own
district oil and gas revenue in the calculation makes lile diﬀerence for the estimates, however. is is likely
because the number of districts is large and no district accounts for more than 10 percent of total oil and gas
revenue.
23Separatist violence in Aceh and Papua has disrupted resource extraction in the past. ese regions are
excluded from the sample.
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price forecast. is policy change was exogenous from the standpoint of district governments
and unrelated to trends in oil and gas production.
5.3 Magnitude and Persistence of Grant Shocks
Speciﬁcations (2) and (3), as well as the theoretical model, are motivated by two hypothetical
grant shocks which have equal initial-period values but diﬀer in their persistence. Results in
the appendix establish that this thought experiment is a good approximation of the actual
variation observed in the sample.
Figure A.4 in the appendix compares the distribution of the absolute two-year change in
the general grant during 2005–2007 to the distribution of all two-year changes in the oil and
gas revenue. e main ﬁnding is that the absolute magnitude of the shocks to the two grants
are reasonably similar for districts with signiﬁcant exposure to the shocks.
e appendix also formally examines the time-series properties of the two grants. e
within-district coeﬃcient of variation of the oil and gas revenue (1.465) is 4.5 times greater
than that of the general grant (0.317), conﬁrming that the oil and gas revenue is signiﬁcantly
more volatile than the general grant. Autoregressions reported in Table A.1 in the appendix
conﬁrm that the general grant is much more persistent over time than the oil and gas revenue.
To summarize, the initial-period shock to the two grants is similar in magnitude, on average,
for districts with high exposure to the grant shocks. Furthermore, the general grant is less
volatile and more persistent than the oil and gas revenue. e sample variation exploited in
the empirical analysis thus mirrors the variation posited in the theoretical model. See the
appendix for further discussion.
6 Results
6.1 Fiscal Outcomes
is section presents the estimates of district ﬁscal responses to the two grants. Panel A of
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the district-level variables. District population averages
around 560 thousand and ranges from about 30 thousad to 5.3 million. Fiscal variables are
measured in constant 2010 IDR 1 million (approximately USD 100) per capita. USD 100 per
capita is approximately the average increase in the general grant experienced by districts above
the 75th percentile in land area per capita, and it would also be a “typical” yearly ﬂuctuation
in oil and gas revenue for a district above the 95th percentile in terms of endowment. (See
Figures 1 and 2.) USD 100 per capita is large relative to district income, representing 7 percent
of average non-oil-and-gas GDP per capita (USD 1,453) and 35 percent of average oil-and-gas
GDP per capita (USD 289). On average district revenue is around USD 210 per capita. Total
revenue varies signiﬁcantly across districts, ranging from USD 36 to around USD 2,400 per
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capita.
Panel (a) of Figure 3 plots total spending over time for districts in resource-poor provinces
and divided into three groups according to land area per capita in 2006. Trends in total spending
were similar across the three groups prior to the general grant reform. is provides suggestive
evidence in support of the identifying assumption that districts with diﬀerent levels of land
area per capita would have followed parallel trends in the absence of the reform. Starting in
2006, total spending increased signiﬁcantly more for districts with a high land area per capita
than districts with a low land area per capita.
Panel (b) of Figure 3 plots total spending over time for districts divided into three groups
according to their oil and gas endowment in 2000. e most richly endowed districts spend
considerably more than resource-poor districts over the sample period, and the spending gap
between resource-rich and resource-poor districts grows over time—likely due to the increase
in oil and gas revenue starting in 2006. Spending in the most richly endowed districts has a
hump shape from 2001–2004, reﬂecting a response to the large increase in shared resource
revenue at the start of decentralization followed by a delayed response to the ensuing decline
in oil and gas revenue. Spending in these districts grows again, particularly sharply in 2008
following the large oil and gas revenue increase in 2006, before falling sharply in 2010. Overall
the time path of spending in resource-rich districts is much smoother than the time path of
total shared oil and gas revenue (doed line).
Table 2 presents the ﬁrst-stage results. To make the ﬁrst-stage estimates readable, land
area per capita is measured in tens of square kilometers per capita, and total shared oil and
gas revenue is measured in 2010 IDR trillions. e ﬁrst instrument, AreaPC06 × NonOilGas ×
1(Year ≥ 2006), has a positive eﬀect on general grant revenue per capita that is signiﬁcant
at the one-percent level. e magnitude and statistical signiﬁcance of this ﬁrst-stage eﬀect
is insensitive to the inclusion of the second instrument, AддOilGasRev × EndowPC , which
has an insigniﬁcant eﬀect on general grant revenue per capita. e second instrument has a
positive eﬀect on oil and gas revenue per capita that is signiﬁcant at the one-percent level.
Similarly, this ﬁrst-stage eﬀect is insensitive to the inclusion of the ﬁrst instrument, which has
an insigniﬁcant eﬀect on oil and gas revenue per capita. In the second-stage regressions, the
Sanderson and Windmeijer (2016) F statistic, which tests for weak identiﬁcation of individual
coeﬃcients on the endogenous variables, is typically 20 or greater for the general grant and 50
or greater for the oil and gas revenue, indicating that the structural parameters are strongly
identiﬁed.
Table 3 presents estimates of the eﬀects of the two grants on the main alternative sources
of revenue. Panel A presents the ordinary least squares estimates, and Panel B presents the
two-stage least squares estimates. In column one, both the OLS and 2SLS estimates suggest
that the grants have lile eﬀect on own-source revenue.
In column two, the OLS results suggest that increasing the general grant by one dollar per
capita raises special allocation grants (Dana Alokasi Khusus, or DAK)—earmarked transfers
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given by the central government on a discretionary basis—by 11 cents per capita. e point
estimate is signiﬁcant at the one-percent level. However, the 2SLS estimate is one-ﬁh the size
of the OLS estimate and is insigniﬁcant. One reason for the discrepancy could be that both
the general and special grants are targeted towards poorer districts, and the OLS estimate is
biased upwards as a result. Alternatively, district governments that eﬀectively bargain with the
central government could increase both the general and special grants, producing upwardly
biased OLS estimates. e estimated impact of oil and gas revenue on special allocation grants
is small—the OLS estimate is 0.03 and the 2SLS estimate is 0.00—and statistically insigniﬁcant.
Finally, the estimates in column 3 suggest that the two grants have no impact on shared
tax revenue. In particular, both grants have an estimated coeﬃcient of 0.00 when estimated
by 2SLS. Overall, there is no indication that the grants crowd out or crowd in other revenue
sources.
Table 4 presents the 2SLS estimates of the cumulative expenditure responses to the two
grants, broken down by economic classiﬁcation. e estimates provide tests of the predictions
outlined in Section 2.6. I report the OLS results, which are likely to be biased, in the appendix
and focus the discussion on the 2SLS results.
Column 1 of Table 4 provides the results for total expenditure per capita. In response to a
permanent increase in the general grant by $1, total spending increases by $0.45 that same
year, $1.30 one year later, $1.88 two years later, and $1.34 three years later. us the spending
response exceeds unity one and two years aer the shock, conﬁrming the ﬁrst prediction
for the general grant. ese responses are not statistically diﬀerent from unity, though the
response aer two years is nearly statistically diﬀerent from unity (p = 0.122). e second
prediction is also conﬁrmed, as the spending response falls by $0.54 from two to three years
aer the shock. is decrease is statistically diﬀerent from zero (p = 0.008).
e ensuing rows of column 1 of Table 4 provide the total expenditure response to oil and
gas revenue. Out of a $1 transitory increase in oil and gas revenue, $0.18 is spent that same
year, $0.73 is spent aer one year, and $1.03 is spent aer two years, and $1.01 is spent aer
three years. e responses aer two and three years are not statistically diﬀerent from unity
(p = 0.936 and p = 0.987, respectively). e cumulative spending responses therefore never
exceed unity, conﬁrming the ﬁrst prediction for oil and gas revenue. e cumulative spending
response also monotonically rises each year before leveling oﬀ at unity starting two years aer
the shock. e results therefore conﬁrm the second prediction as well.
e evidence so far conﬁrms the predictions that are speciﬁc to each grant. Do the spending
responses to the two grants diﬀer from each other? Panel (a) of Figure 4 plots the total
expenditure responses to the two grants. e response to the general grant is hump-shaped,
peaking two years aer the shock and then falling. By contrast, the spending response to
the oil and gas revenue is more gradual, climbing each year before leveling oﬀ. Column 1 of
Table 4 tests whether these two spending paths are statistically diﬀerent from each other. e
response aer one year is $0.57 higher for the general grant, and the diﬀerence is statistically
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signiﬁcant (p = 0.050). Aer two years the disparity is even greater at $0.85, though this
diﬀerence is statistically insigniﬁcant. e joint hypothesis that the cumulative spending
responses to the two grants are equal in all periods is soundly rejected (p = 0.008). Overall, the
evidence suggests that the paths of the spending responses to the two grants are qualitatively
and quantitatively diﬀerent.
Columns 2 through 4 of Table 4 report the responses of capital, goods and services, person-
nel, and “other” expenditure. Interestingly, practically the entire response of capital expenditure
to the general grant occurs with a one-year delay, while there is a larger contemporaneous
response of goods and services and personnel. e reason could be that the laer two categories
may be associated with fewer bureaucratic delays compared to capital expenditure.
Table 5 presents 2SLS estimates of the expenditure responses broken down by function.
ese estimates are based on a smaller sample, because spending by function is only available
until 2012. Interestingly, the education, health, and infrastructure expenditure responses to the
general grant largely occur with a delay before subsequently declining, which is consistent
with red tape delaying upfront investment in structures. By contrast, the general grant induces
an immediate and temporary increase in spending on administration, which may be adjusted
more quickly by hiring more bureaucrats. Consistent with the results for total expenditure,
the responses to the oil and gas revenue generally increase monotonically over time and do
not exhibit a hump shape.
So far, the evidence on ﬁscal responses is consistent with the theoretical model, suggesting
that the permanent increase in the general grant induced a front-loaded spending response in
order to overcome an investment threshold. e spending increase in response to a transitory
increase in oil and gas revenue is instead spread fairly evenly across four years.
e theoretical model also predicts that the two grants will have diﬀerent eﬀects on the
share of expenditure devoted to diﬀerent spending categories. In particular, the assumption of
homothetic preferences together with the lumpiness constraint imply that a large increase in
permanent income should not aﬀect expenditure shares, while a small increase in permanent
income should decrease the share of spending on lumpy items and increase the share of
spending on non-lumpy items. Tables 6 and 7 report the eﬀects of the two grants on the share
of expenditure devoted to diﬀerent categories. Focusing on the 2SLS results, the general grant
has small and statistically insigniﬁcant eﬀects on the expenditure shares of capital, goods and
services, and personnel. By contrast, an increase in oil and gas revenue by 100 USD per capita
reduces the capital expenditure share by 8 percentage points, and this eﬀect is signiﬁcant at the
ﬁve-percent level. Oil and gas revenue also positively impacts the expenditure shares of goods
and services and personnel, though these eﬀects are statistically insigniﬁcant. e results on
expenditure shares lend further support for the theoretical model.
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6.1.1 Flypaper Eﬀect
A voluminous literature ﬁnds that local governments increase spending more in response to
an increase in unconditional grant revenue than to an equally sized increase in local private
income (Inman, 2008). e result is an anomaly under the assumption that policy reﬂects
the preferences of the median voter in the locality (Hines and aler, 1995). To address this
literature, Table A.6 in the appendix reports results from ﬂypaper-style regressions which add
oil-and-gas GDP and non-oil-and-gas GDP to the regression. e ﬂypaper eﬀect is extremely
large—the marginal propensity to spend out of non-oil-and-gas GDP is only around 0.01, or
one cent for every dollar of income, while the marginal propensity to spend out of each grant
is at least one.24 is is unsurprising given district governments’ limited ability to tax local
income. e propensity to spend out of non-oil-and-gas GDP exceeds the propensity to spend
out of oil-and-gas GDP. e laer even appears to be negative, albeit statistically insigniﬁcant.
6.2 Public Goods and Services
is section presents estimates of the eﬀects of the two grants on the provision of public
schools, health facilities, health personnel, and road quality. I focus on these public goods due
to data availability and the fact that district governments are responsible for either provision
(education and health) or ﬁnancing (local roads) of these goods.25
Panel B of Table 1 provides summary statistics for the village-level variables. e average
village population is around 3,410. On average there are 0.94 public schools per 1,000 villagers,
and the number of public primary schools is over six times the number of public secondary
schools.26 Villages average 0.17 primary health care centers (known as puskesmas), 0.11 doctors,
and 0.54 midwives per 1,000 villagers. e main village road is made of asphalt—as opposed to
gravel, dirt, or other materials—in 70 percent of villages. e annual change in public schools
and health care centers is 0.01 of either sign on average. A typical district in Indonesia contains
hundreds of villages. In the sample of villages successfully merged across all waves of the
village census, the average number of villages per district is 204. I measure each grant variable
in terms of average annual revenue over the inter-survey period, in units of constant 2010 IDR
1 million (approximately USD 100) per capita.
Table 8 displays estimates of the eﬀects of the two grants on public goods and services
(β and δ in equation (3)). Panel A presents the OLS estimates, and Panel B presents the 2SLS
24For the OLS results, we can reject the hypotheses that each grant produces the same total spending response
as each type of GDP at the one-percent level. e 2SLS estimates are less precise—the smaller sample size due to
GDP data being available only until 2013 exacerbates the problem. e spending response to oil and gas revenue
is statistically distinguishable from the response to GDP at the 10-percent level, though the diﬀerence between
the responses to the general grant and GDP just misses statistical signiﬁcance.
25Village governments play a lead role in the upgrading and maintenance of local infrastructure, such as roads,
bridges, and piped water systems. Districts contribute to the ﬁnancing of village infrastructure projects and
procure engineers, but in most cases village governments initiate and implement the projects (World Bank, 2010).
26Here I deﬁne “public schools” as the sum of primary and secondary public schools.
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estimates. e ﬁrst column contains the results for the sum of public primary and secondary
schools, while columns 2 and 3 present the results for public primary schools and public
secondary schools, respectively. e OLS results indicate that increasing the general grant
by USD 100 per capita raises the annual change in public schools per 1,000 villagers by 0.006.
is means that permanently raising the general grant by USD 100 per capita in the nine-year,
post-reform period (2006–2014) has the cumulative eﬀect of increasing the stock of public
schools per 1,000 villagers by 0.054, almost six percent of the sample mean. e estimate is
statistically insigniﬁcant, however. Columns 2 and 3 show that the eﬀect of the general grant
on public schools is driven by the eﬀect on secondary schools, which is statistically signiﬁcant
at the one-percent level. e eﬀect of oil and gas revenue on public schools is −0.003 and is
statistically insigniﬁcant.
e 2SLS estimates for public schools are larger in magnitude. According to these estimates,
an increase in the general grant of USD 100 per capita raises the annual change in schools per
1,000 villagers by 0.028, and this eﬀect is signiﬁcant at the one-percent level. e corresponding
eﬀect of oil and gas revenue is only 0.007 and is statistically insigniﬁcant. Once again, the
estimates suggest that the impact of the general grant on public schools is concentrated on
secondary schools. e eﬀect of the general grant is economically quite large. Permanently
raising the general grant by USD 100 per capita in the post-reform period increases the stock
of public schools per 1,000 villagers by 0.252, which is 27 percent of the sample mean. e
2SLS estimates for the two grants are statistically diﬀerent from each other at the ﬁve-percent
and one-percent levels, respectively, for all public schools and public secondary schools.
Columns 4–6 of Table 8 present estimates of the impact of the grants on health facilities
and personnel. Similar to the results on public schools, the 2SLS estimates of the eﬀect of the
general grant are all larger than the OLS results by a factor of roughly two or more. According
to the 2SLS estimates, increasing the general grant by USD 100 per capita raises the annual
change in health care centers per 1,000 villagers by 0.084, which implies an economically large
eﬀect. Permanently raising the general grant by USD 100 per capita in the post-reform period
increases the stock of health care centers per 1,000 villagers by 0.756, which is four times
the sample mean. Note, however, that the 95-percent conﬁdence interval is wide, ranging
from 0.002 to 0.166. e corresponding point estimate for oil and gas revenue is 0.020 and is
statistically insigniﬁcant. e eﬀects of the two grants on health care centers are statistically
diﬀerent from one another at the ﬁve-percent level. e general grant also signiﬁcantly
increased the number of health personnel: increasing the general grant by USD 100 per capita
raises the number of doctors and midwives per 1,000 villagers by 0.036 and 0.199, respectively,
representing a 33 percent increase in doctors and a 37 percent increase in midwives relative
to their respective sample means. Both eﬀects are signiﬁcant at the ﬁve-percent level. e
eﬀects of oil and gas revenue on health personnel are an order of magnitude smaller and
are statistically indistinguishable from zero. For both doctors and midwives, we reject the
hypothesis that the two grants have the same eﬀect on health personnel at the one-percent
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level.
Column 7 of Table 8 presents estimates of the impact of the grants on road quality. e
outcome equals one if the main village road is paved with asphalt, and zero otherwise. Impor-
tantly, the outcome measures the quality of an existing road, not the construction of a new
road. According to the OLS estimates, increasing the general grant by USD 100 per capita
raises the probability of the main road being made of asphalt by 0.015. is eﬀect is statistically
insigniﬁcant. e corresponding estimate for oil and gas revenue is 0.043 and is signiﬁcant
at the 10-percent level. We fail to reject the hypothesis that the two OLS estimates are equal.
e 2SLS estimate of the eﬀect of the general grant is much larger at 0.063 and is statistically
signiﬁcant at the ﬁve-percent level. is eﬀect represents a nine-percent increase relative to the
sample mean. e 2SLS estimate for oil and gas revenue is of a similar magnitude—0.053—and
is signiﬁcant at the ﬁve-percent level. is eﬀect is eight percent of the sample mean. Once
again, we fail to reject the hypothesis that the two grants have the same eﬀect on road quality.
ree lessons emerge from this subsection. First, the general grant induced larger increases
in lumpy public goods and services, per dollar of revenue, than the oil and gas revenue. e
general grant caused increases in every lumpy category of public goods and services—durable
structures and personnel—and these increases were both economically large and statistically
distinguishable from the eﬀect of oil and gas revenue. By contrast, the oil and gas revenue
had small and statistically insigniﬁcant eﬀects on lumpy public goods and services. us, the
results conﬁrm the theoretical prediction that permanent revenue shocks will have a greater
impact on public goods that require lumpy investment than transitory revenue shocks. Of
course, health personnel do not require such an investment. However, adding an additional
doctor or midwife requires incurring an upfront ﬁxed cost associated with commiing funds
toward paying a salary for a year or more. Such a transaction is lumpy compared to, say,
raising doctor wages by a small amount. e lumpiness of the personnel hiring decision is
magniﬁed by the fact that public workers in Indonesia enjoy signiﬁcant job security.27 Hiring
a worker entails a signiﬁcant ﬁnancial commitment.
Second, the two grants had similar eﬀects on road quality. Road maintenance in one year
does not commit the government to maintenance in future years and thus represents a less
lumpy outcome. e fact that both grants increase road quality to a similar degree indicates
that lumpiness, rather than gra, drives the diﬀerential responses of structures and personnel
to the two grants.
Finally, the discrepancy between the OLS and 2SLS estimates is typically much larger
for the general grant than for oil and gas revenue, suggesting that endogeneity concerns are
more important for the general grant. is is important for researchers to keep in mind when
evaluating the eﬀects of the general grant, which is the most important source of funding for
district governments in Indonesia.
27In ﬁeld interviews, public-sector midwives in Yogyakarta said that they could earn signiﬁcantly more in the
private sector but stayed in the public sector due to job security (UNFPA Indonesia, 2014, p. 47).
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6.3 reats to Validity
One potential concern is that the results for the general grant could simply reﬂect catch-up
growth by more remote, less developed regions. e instrument captures variation in the
general grant driven by the increased importance of land area per capita in the allocation
formula in the years 2006 and later. If more densely populated districts were experiencing
diﬀerent time trends in outcomes than less densely populated districts for reasons other than
the general grant reform, the 2SLS estimates would be asymptotically biased. While districts
with diﬀerent levels of land area per capita may diﬀer in their level of public goods and services,
the identifying assumption is that they would have followed parallel trends over time in the
absence of the reform. While this assumption is untestable, it produces a corollary which is
testable: the partial eﬀect of land area per capita on outcomes should be constant over time
prior to the reform.
To test this prediction, I estimate the equation
Yvdis =
∑
j∈J
θjAreaPC06di × NonOilGasdi × 1(s = j)
+
∑
j∈J
γjEndowPCdi × 1(s = j) + ϕd + ρis + uvdis,
where J is the set of time periods s for which data on Y exist.28 e (omied) reference period
is 2004–2005. e parameters {θj}j∈J capture how outcomes vary over time according to the
district’s exposure to the general grant reform. Likewise, the parameters {γj}j∈J reﬂect how
exposure to ﬂuctuations in oil and gas revenue aﬀects outcomes over time. Each parameter
represents the partial eﬀect of grant exposure in a time period relative to its eﬀect in 2004–2005,
the time period prior to the general grant reform. Panel (a) of Figure 5 plots estimates of
{θj}j∈J , and Panel (b) plots estimates of {γj}j∈J . As shown in the ﬁgure, we fail to reject the
hypothesis that exposure to the general grant reform had the same impact on outcomes in the
period 2001–2003 as it did in the period 2004–2005 at the 95-percent level. is result implies
that districts with varying levels of exposure to the general grant reform were on parallel
trends prior to the reform, lending credence to the causal interpretation of the main results for
public goods and services.
7 Conclusion
Indonesia’s ﬁscal decentralization reforms produced large increases in unconditional grants to
district governments. e manner in which these grants were delivered depended on district
characteristics: districts with greater land area per capita and few natural resources saw a
larger permanent increase in general grant revenue starting in 2006. Districts that were richly
28EndowPCdi is average endowment over the sample period.
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endowed with oil and natural gas saw lile variation in the general grant over this period,
but they experienced large swings in the oil and gas revenue that factored heavily into their
budgets. us, while one set of districts experienced a one-time, permanent increase in grant
revenue, another faced frequent transitory shocks to grant revenue. e responses to these
two grants reveal the degree to which local governments are forward-looking.
eory predicts that both the timing and the composition of the spending response to a
revenue shock depend on whether the shock was permanent or transitory—as long as the time
horizon is at least two years. A permanent increase in revenue by one dollar is more likely to
allow the government to overcome a minimum size requirement for investment in durable
goods, such as schools, leading to a front-loaded total spending response. A transitory increase
in revenue by one dollar, on the other hand, has a smaller impact on permanent public income
and is less likely to allow the government to overcome the up-front investment constraint,
skewing spending towards nondurables which can be varied continuously.
e empirical results conﬁrm that local governments respond to a permanent increase
in grant revenue by front-loading expenditure and increasing the provision of lumpy public
goods. Transitory shocks to grant revenue elicit smoother ﬁscal responses and have lile
impact on lumpy public goods. e results are consistent with local governments operating
with a time horizon of three to ﬁve years.
e results of this paper are informative for policymakers in central governments, which
have the option of changing intergovernmental grant allocations on a temporary or permanent
basis. Central governments oen use grants to promote their own ﬁscal goals. Grant policy
also maers for economic outcomes. e permanence of a grant reform could maer for
aggregate output responses, for at least two reasons. First, it inﬂuences the timing of the
ﬁscal response, and output multipliers vary according to labor market slackness (Michaillat,
2014). Second, it inﬂuences the composition of the ﬁscal response, and diﬀerent types of public
expenditure have diﬀerent output multipliers (Boehm, 2019).
is paper also makes an important methodological point: the estimated eﬀects of local
revenue on lumpy public goods will depend on the nature of the identifying variation in
revenue. e ﬁnding that local tax revenue raises public good provision more than grants in a
particular context need not imply that governments are held more accountable for how they
spend tax revenue. Rather, it could be the result of tax revenue being subject to more persistent
shocks, in combination with forward-looking government policymaking. is is a realistic
concern, as previous studies have exploited tax-revenue shocks generated by investments in tax
administration (Gadenne, 2017) and upward revisions to assessed property values (Martı´nez,
2017). Both interventions cause persistent increases in tax revenue. By contrast, shocks
to intergovernmental grants can be transitory or persistent, depending on the context. A
necessary step toward isolating the accountability eﬀects of taxation is to establish that tax
and non-tax revenue are subject to similar types of shocks.29
29In Gadenne (2017), grants and taxes have similar within-municipality coeﬃcients of variation.
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To what extent are the results of this paper informative for other countries? e relative
unimportance of local taxation in Indonesia contrasts sharply with the federal systems in many
high-income countries, such as the United States. e results may therefore be more applicable
to developing countries, where local taxation is less important (Gadenne and Singhal, 2014).
Certainly, the absolute level of the expenditure response to grant revenue should be lower
when there is scope for cuing local taxes, and indeed this is the case (Hines and aler, 1995;
Inman, 2008). Nonetheless, the results of this paper may be predictive of the relative responses
to permanent and transitory shocks to local government revenue. National reforms oen
produce both types of shocks to local taxes. In the United States, the Tax Reform Act of 1986
broadened the deﬁnition of taxable income, permanently increasing state tax revenue in states
that used the federal deﬁnition of taxable income (Ladd, 1993). e same reform also increased
the tax rate on capital gains. is caused a spike in capital-gains realizations right before the
higher rate was to take eﬀect, resulting in a transitory increase in state tax revenue (Auten,
1999). Future research should examine how local governments respond to permanent and
transitory shocks to revenue in contexts with signiﬁcant local taxation.
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8 Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
Panel A: District-Level Variables
Total Revenue per Capita 2.11 1.89 0.36 23.71 4,836
Own-Source Revenue per Capita 0.14 0.19 0.00 3.63 4,819
Special Allocation Revenue per Capita 0.13 0.17 0.00 3.30 4,726
Shared Tax Revenue per Capita 0.15 0.20 0.00 4.96 4,660
Total Expenditure per Capita 2.05 1.84 0.01 22.52 4,622
Capital Expenditure per Capita 0.56 0.77 0.00 11.05 4,651
Goods & Services Expenditure per Capita 0.40 0.43 0.00 7.45 4,657
Personnel Expenditure per Capita 0.91 0.57 0.01 6.69 4,670
Other Expenditure per Capita 0.16 0.24 0.00 5.46 4,619
Education Expenditure per Capita 0.53 0.33 0.00 3.10 3,910
Administration Expenditure per Capita 0.64 0.76 0.01 11.18 3,991
Infrastructure Expenditure per Capita 0.35 0.59 0.00 10.76 3,906
Health Expenditure per Capita 0.16 0.15 0.00 1.80 3,909
Agriculture Expenditure per Capita 0.09 0.11 0.00 1.12 3,892
General Grant Revenue per Capita 1.19 0.87 0.00 7.95 5,004
Oil & Gas Revenue per Capita 0.17 0.66 0.00 10.17 5,004
AreaPC06 × Non-Oil/Gas × Year ≥ 2006 0.10 0.27 0.00 2.72 5,004
Agg. Oil & Gas Rev. × Endow. per Capita 0.22 0.79 0.00 10.30 5,004
Non-Oil/Gas GDP per Capita 14.53 16.18 0.63 262.21 4,652
Oil/Gas GDP per Capita 2.89 24.59 0.00 563.51 4,652
Population (Millions) 0.56 0.59 0.03 5.33 5,025
Panel B: Village-Level Variables
Public Schools per 1,000 People 0.94 0.71 0.00 11.86 204,488
Public Primary Schools per 1,000 People 0.81 0.57 0.00 8.82 204,488
Public Secondary Schools per 1,000 People 0.13 0.32 0.00 7.91 204,488
Primary Health Care Centers per 1,000 People 0.17 0.36 0.00 6.98 163,073
Doctors per 1,000 People 0.11 0.32 0.00 8.86 204,488
Midwives per 1,000 People 0.54 0.69 0.00 10.71 204,488
Main Road Made of Asphalt 0.70 0.46 0.00 1.00 201,956
Avg. ∆ Public Schools per 1,000 People −0.01 0.14 −3.50 3.14 204,488
Avg. ∆ Public Primary Schools per 1,000 People −0.01 0.12 −2.35 2.77 204,488
Avg. ∆ Public Secondary Schools per 1,000 People 0.01 0.08 −2.31 2.04 204,488
Avg. ∆ Primary Health Care Centers per 1,000 People 0.01 0.12 −2.45 2.33 163,073
Population (ousands) 3.41 2.62 0.22 17.83 204,488
Villages per District (Hundreds) 2.04 1.13 0.01 4.57 204,488
Notes. All ﬁscal and GDP variables are measured in constant 2010 IDR 1 million (≈ USD 100) per capita. Village-
level variables are measured per 1,000 villagers.
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Table 2: First Stage: General Grant and Oil and Gas Revenue
General Grant p.c. Oil & Gas Revenue p.c.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AreaPC06 × Non-Oil/Gas × Year ≥ 2006 0.67∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.00
(0.17) (0.17) (0.02)
Agg. Oil & Gas Rev. × Endow. per Capita −0.07 0.79∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07)
Observations 5,004 5,004 5,004 5,004
District clusters 372 372 372 372
Prov. × year clusters 384 384 384 384
Notes. Each regression includes a full set of district and island × year dummies. Standard errors, reported in
parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and two-way clustering by district and province × year. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3: Eﬀects of the Grants on Alternative Revenue Sources
Panel A: OLS
Revenue per Capita
(1) (2) (3)
Own-Source Special Allocation Shared Taxes
General Grant p.c. 0.02∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
Oil & Gas Revenue p.c. 0.02 0.03∗ 0.07
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05)
Observations 4,705 4,705 4,549
District clusters 372 372 372
Prov. × year clusters 384 384 384
Test: coefs equal 0.924 0.004 0.271
Panel B: 2SLS
Revenue per Capita
(1) (2) (3)
Own-Source Special Allocation Shared Taxes
General Grant p.c. 0.01 0.02 0.00
(0.03) (0.06) (0.04)
Oil & Gas Revenue p.c. 0.01 −0.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Observations 4,705 4,705 4,549
District clusters 372 372 372
Prov. × year clusters 384 384 384
F -stat. Gen. Grant 17.1 17.1 17.8
F -stat. Oil & Gas Rev. 80.4 80.4 65.8
Test: coefs equal 0.865 0.745 0.980
Notes. Panel A presents OLS estimates, and Panel B presents 2SLS estimates. Each regression includes a full set of
district and island × year dummies. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and
two-way clustering by district and province × year. Sanderson and Windmeijer (2016) ﬁrst-stage F -statistics are
reported for each endogeneous variable. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 4: Expenditure Responses by Economic Classiﬁcation (2SLS)
Cumulative Response: Expenditure per Capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Capital Goods & Services Personnel Other
General Grant p.c.
0 Years later 0.45 0.06 0.23 0.11 0.07
(0.34) (0.75) (0.18) (0.10) (0.13)
1 Year later 1.30∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.23∗∗ 0.11
(0.25) (0.16) (0.17) (0.09) (0.11)
2 Years later 1.88∗∗∗ 0.48 0.28∗ 0.15∗ 0.20∗
(0.57) (0.29) (0.16) (0.09) (0.11)
3 Years later 1.34∗∗∗ 0.47 0.28∗ 0.26 0.24
(0.43) (0.32) (0.15) (0.18) (0.16)
Oil & Gas Revenue p.c.
0 Years later 0.18 0.15 −0.00 0.01 0.03
(0.16) (0.10) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05)
1 Year later 0.73∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗ 0.10 0.15∗∗ 0.10
(0.22) (0.17) (0.09) (0.07) (0.11)
2 Years later 1.03∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.12 0.13 0.14
(0.39) (0.15) (0.09) (0.09) (0.13)
3 Years later 1.01∗∗ 0.45∗∗ 0.16 0.17 0.17
(0.49) (0.21) (0.12) (0.13) (0.19)
Test: Equal responses, 0 years 0.278 0.895 0.247 0.159 0.783
Test: Equal responses, 1 year 0.050 0.617 0.195 0.317 0.993
Test: Equal responses, 2 years 0.179 0.745 0.404 0.782 0.738
Test: Equal responses, 3 years 0.522 0.925 0.524 0.527 0.740
Test: Equal responses, all years 0.008 0.905 0.665 0.626 0.828
Observations 3,590 3,630 3,630 3,640 3,596
District clusters 372 372 372 372 372
Prov. × year clusters 306 306 306 306 306
Notes. is table reports 2SLS estimates of the cumulative spending responses aer S years, derived from (2), to
the general grant (
∑S
k=0 βk ) and oil and gas revenue (
∑S
k=0 δk ). Each regression includes a full set of district and
island × year dummies. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and two-way
clustering by district and province × year. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 5: Expenditure Responses by Function (2SLS)
Cumulative Response: Expenditure per Capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Education Administration Infrastructure Health Agriculture
General Grant p.c.
0 Years later 0.08 1.15∗∗∗ −0.41 −0.02 0.03
(0.10) (0.32) (0.65) (0.02) (0.05)
1 Year later 0.17∗ 0.37 0.41 0.10∗∗∗ 0.06∗
(0.10) (0.44) (0.26) (0.02) (0.03)
2 Years later −0.07 0.35 0.37∗∗ 0.06∗ 0.11∗∗
(0.12) (0.26) (0.19) (0.03) (0.05)
3 Years later 0.07 0.34 0.34 0.08∗∗ 0.08∗∗
(0.11) (0.35) (0.23) (0.04) (0.03)
Oil & Gas Revenue p.c.
0 Years later 0.02 −0.03 0.16 −0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.19) (0.22) (0.02) (0.01)
1 Year later 0.09 −0.36 0.53 0.01 0.03
(0.06) (0.33) (0.36) (0.04) (0.02)
2 Years later 0.19∗∗∗ −0.28 0.50∗∗ 0.02 0.03
(0.07) (0.45) (0.26) (0.05) (0.02)
3 Years later 0.25∗∗∗ −0.28 0.74∗∗ 0.02 0.04
(0.10) (0.64) (0.37) (0.08) (0.04)
Test: Equal responses, 0 years 0.641 0.004 0.485 0.720 0.688
Test: Equal responses, 1 year 0.538 0.140 0.814 0.144 0.348
Test: Equal responses, 2 years 0.132 0.184 0.752 0.478 0.201
Test: Equal responses, 3 years 0.324 0.313 0.418 0.531 0.452
Test: Equal responses, all years 0.196 0.041 0.358 0.096 0.738
Observations 2,893 2,948 2,893 2,892 2,879
District clusters 372 372 372 372 372
Prov. × year clusters 249 249 249 249 249
Notes. is table reports 2SLS estimates of the cumulative spending responses aer S years, derived from (2), to
the general grant (
∑S
k=0 βk ) and oil and gas revenue (
∑S
k=0 δk ). Each regression includes a full set of district and
island × year dummies. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and two-way
clustering by district and province × year. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 6: Expenditure Share Responses by Economic Classiﬁcation (2SLS)
Cumulative Response: Expenditure Share (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capital Goods & Services Personnel Other
General Grant p.c.
0 Years later −1.30 1.54 −0.77 1.26
(8.01) (2.94) (4.14) (2.78)
1 Year later 0.81 2.34 −3.63 −1.07
(3.77) (1.92) (2.57) (2.40)
2 Years later −2.78 0.82 −2.06 0.49
(4.63) (1.94) (3.07) (2.26)
3 Years later −2.03 2.00 −2.75 2.92
(4.30) (2.25) (2.95) (3.00)
Oil & Gas Revenue p.c.
0 Years later −0.64 −0.50 1.06 0.52
(1.19) (0.50) (0.70) (0.54)
1 Year later −3.25∗ 0.26 1.73 1.01
(1.91) (0.97) (1.12) (1.12)
2 Years later −6.16∗∗ 0.43 2.09 2.04
(2.55) (1.07) (1.58) (1.44)
3 Years later −8.37∗∗ 1.88 2.47 3.55
(3.56) (1.54) (2.20) (2.32)
Test: Equal responses, 0 years 0.928 0.488 0.627 0.764
Test: Equal responses, 1 year 0.286 0.308 0.060 0.374
Test: Equal responses, 2 years 0.431 0.843 0.199 0.478
Test: Equal responses, 3 years 0.092 0.958 0.090 0.807
Test: Equal responses, all years 0.347 0.725 0.347 0.182
Observations 3,577 3,576 3,586 3,542
District clusters 372 372 372 372
Prov. × year clusters 306 306 306 306
Notes. is table reports 2SLS estimates of the cumulative spending responses aer S years, derived from (2), to
the general grant (
∑S
k=0 βk ) and oil and gas revenue (
∑S
k=0 δk ). Each regression includes a full set of district and
island × year dummies. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and two-way
clustering by district and province × year. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 7: Expenditure Share Responses by Function (2SLS)
Cumulative Response: Expenditure Share (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Education Administration Infrastructure Health Agriculture
General Grant p.c.
0 Years later 2.43 3.74 −2.24 −0.88 0.46
(2.58) (7.83) (7.09) (0.61) (0.83)
1 Year later −0.23 −9.41 2.42 −0.11 −0.08
(1.97) (6.66) (4.25) (0.86) (0.59)
2 Years later 0.39 −9.30∗ 0.15 −0.13 −0.02
(2.46) (5.63) (4.46) (1.01) (0.86)
3 Years later 0.07 −7.36 1.06 −0.15 −0.08
(2.72) (7.38) (4.88) (1.12) (0.85)
Oil & Gas Revenue p.c.
0 Years later 1.00∗∗ −1.47 −2.57 −0.32 −0.20∗
(0.49) (1.93) (1.79) (0.26) (0.11)
1 Year later 1.57 −4.87 −2.43 −0.27 −0.46∗∗
(1.15) (4.06) (2.87) (0.51) (0.21)
2 Years later 3.37∗∗ −5.50 −6.26∗∗ −0.58 −0.52∗
(1.48) (5.92) (3.04) (0.63) (0.30)
3 Years later 3.92∗ −6.58 −7.12 −0.45 −0.52
(2.15) (7.92) (4.78) (1.02) (0.45)
Test: Equal responses, 0 years 0.603 0.481 0.965 0.384 0.415
Test: Equal responses, 1 year 0.422 0.436 0.284 0.857 0.541
Test: Equal responses, 2 years 0.312 0.623 0.210 0.693 0.585
Test: Equal responses, 3 years 0.269 0.926 0.154 0.833 0.593
Test: Equal responses, all years 0.564 0.505 0.498 0.680 0.789
Observations 2,680 2,735 2,680 2,679 2,666
District clusters 372 372 372 372 372
Prov. × year clusters 249 249 249 249 249
Notes. is table reports 2SLS estimates of the cumulative spending responses aer S years, derived from (2), to
the general grant (
∑S
k=0 βk ) and oil and gas revenue (
∑S
k=0 δk ). Each regression includes a full set of district and
island × year dummies. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and two-way
clustering by district and province × year. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 8: Second Stage: Public Goods and Services
Panel A: OLS
Average Annual Change in Stock per Capita Personnel per Capita Main Road
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All Public Schools Public Primary Schools Public Secondary Schools Health Care Centers Doctors Midwives Asphalt
Avg. General Grant p.c. 0.006 −0.004 0.010∗∗∗ 0.023∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.015
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.012) (0.006) (0.033) (0.010)
Avg. Oil & Gas Revenue p.c. −0.003 −0.003 0.000 −0.005 −0.003 −0.032 0.043∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.019) (0.007) (0.035) (0.023)
Observations 204,488 204,488 204,488 163,073 204,488 204,488 201,956
District clusters 372 372 372 372 372 372 372
Prov. × year clusters 137 137 137 109 137 137 137
Test: Coeﬃcients equal 0.127 0.938 0.036 0.198 0.002 0.001 0.220
Panel B: 2SLS
Average Annual Change in Stock per Capita Personnel per Capita Main Road
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All Public Schools Public Primary Schools Public Secondary Schools Health Care Centers Doctors Midwives Asphalt
Avg. General Grant p.c. 0.028∗∗∗ 0.005 0.023∗∗ 0.084∗∗ 0.036∗∗ 0.199∗∗ 0.063∗∗
(0.009) (0.013) (0.010) (0.042) (0.015) (0.085) (0.031)
Avg. Oil & Gas Revenue p.c. 0.007 0.003 0.004 0.020 −0.009 −0.001 0.053∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.029) (0.008) (0.046) (0.026)
Observations 204,488 204,488 204,488 163,073 204,488 204,488 201,956
District clusters 372 372 372 372 372 372 372
Prov. × year clusters 137 137 137 109 137 137 137
F -stat. Gen. Grant 25.4 25.4 25.4 29.9 25.4 25.4 21.7
F -stat. Oil & Gas Rev. 72.6 72.6 72.6 62.7 72.6 72.6 70.5
Test: Coeﬃcients equal 0.021 0.817 0.008 0.026 0.000 0.006 0.749
Notes. Panel A presents OLS estimates, and Panel B presents 2SLS estimates. In columns 1–3 and 5–7, the sample includes the time periods 2001–03, 2004–05, 2006–08, 2009–11,
and 2012–14. In column 4 the time periods are 2001–03, 2004–05, 2006–11, and 2012–14, due to missing data on health care centers in 2008. e outcomes in columns 1–4 are
measured as the average annual change in the stock of the public good per 1,000 villagers over the time period. e outcomes in columns 5–6 are measured as the number of
health personnel per 1,000 villagers at the end of the time period. e outcome in column 7 is an indicator variable equal to one if the village main road is made of asphalt, and
zero otherwise. e grant variables are measured as the average annual revenue in constant 2010 IDR 1 million (≈ USD 100) per capita at the district level. Each regression
includes a full set of district and island × year dummies. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and two-way clustering by district and
province × year. Sanderson and Windmeijer (2016) ﬁrst-stage F -statistics are reported for each endogeneous variable. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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9 Figures
Figure 1: General Grant Revenue per Capita by Land Area per Capita
(a) Non-Oil/Gas Provinces
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(b) Oil/Gas Provinces
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Notes. is ﬁgure plots average general grant revenue in constant 2010 IDR per capita (millions) for districts
divided into three groups according to land area per capita in 2006. Panel (a) uses districts located in non-oil-and-
gas provinces, and Panel (b) uses districts located in oil and gas provinces. Oil and gas provinces are those that
receive a non-trivial amount of oil and gas revenue per capita: Riau, Kepulauan Riau, Jambi, Sumatera Selatan,
Kalimantan Timur, and Kalimantan Utara. e gray dashed line indicates the timing of the general grant reform.
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Figure 2: Shared Oil and Gas Revenue and Value of Production
(a) Aggregate Shared Oil and Gas Revenue and Weighted Value of Production
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(b) Average Shared Oil and Gas Revenue per Capita by Endowment
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Notes. Panel (a) plots total oil and gas revenue shared with districts (solid line) and the weighted value of oil and
gas production (dashed line), deﬁned using the weights from the central government’s revenue-sharing rule:
0.06 · Poilt · Q
oil
t + 0.12 · P
дas
t · Q
дas
t . Both series are expressed in constant 2010 IDR (trillions). Panel (b) plots
average oil and gas revenue in constant 2010 IDR per capita (millions) for districts divided into three groups
according to oil and gas endowment.
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Figure 3: Total Expenditure Responses to the Two Grants
(a) Total Expenditure per Capita by Area per Capita, Non-Oil/Gas Provinces
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(b) Total Expenditure per Capita by Oil and Gas Endowment
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Notes. Panel (a) plots average total expenditure in constant 2010 IDR per capita (millions) for districts divided into
three groups according to land area per capita in 2006. e sample excludes the six provinces with signiﬁcant oil
and gas revenue per capita—Riau, Kepulauan Riau, Jambi, Sumatera Selatan, Kalimantan Timur, and Kalimantan
Utara. e gray dashed line indicates the timing of the general grant reform. Panel (b) plots average total
expenditure in constant 2010 IDR per capita (millions) for districts divided into three groups according to oil and
gas endowment in 2000.
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Figure 4: Cumulative Expenditure Responses to $1 Increase in Grant per Capita
(a) Total Expenditure per Capita
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(b) Capital Expenditure per Capita
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(c) Goods & Services Expenditure per Capita
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Notes. is ﬁgure plots 2SLS estimates and 90-percent conﬁdence intervals of the cumulative spending responses aer S years, derived from (2), to the general grant (
∑S
k=0 βk )
and oil and gas revenue (
∑S
k=0 δk ).
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Figure 5: e Eﬀect of Grant Exposure on Public Goods and Services over Time
(a) e Eﬀect of Land Area per Capita by Time Period
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(b) e Eﬀect of Oil and Gas Endowment by Time Period
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Notes. is ﬁgure displays point estimates and 95-percent conﬁdence intervals from the regression Yvdis =∑
j ∈J θ jAreaPC06di × NonOilGasdi × 1(s = j) +
∑
j ∈J γjEndowPCdi × 1(s = j) + ϕd + ρis + uvdis , where J is
the set of years for which data on Y exist, and EndowPCd is average endowment over the sample period. e
(omied) reference year is s = 2005. Panel (a) plots {θ j }j ∈J , and Panel (b) plots {γj }j ∈J .
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A Appendix (For Online Publication)
A.1 Discussion of Extensions to eoretical Model
is section brieﬂy discusses several extensions to the theoretical model.
A.1.1 Supply Bottlenecks
First, the local government could face constraints in the supply of non-traded inputs to durables
investment. e model assumes that the government can freely purchase any quantity of the
investment goods at the ﬁxed price pt . is would be the case if the investment goods were
purchased on world markets. In reality, inputs such as building materials may be non-traded,
and their supply may be constrained by the current stock of public goods (van der Ploeg and
Venables, 2013). As a consequence, the government may face an upward-sloping supply curve
for investment goods. Suppose now that the price of investment is pt + ψIt/2, so that the
marginal cost of investment is increasing and linear in the level of investment. en equation
(1) is modiﬁed to become
(1 − γ )Ct
γDt
= ιt +ψ (Dt − (1 − δ )Dt−1) −
1 − δ
1 + r
ψ (Dt+1 − (1 − δ )Dt ), (A.1)
where ιt is the user cost of durables in the absence of supply bolenecks. e new user cost of
durables, given by the right-hand side of (A.1), is increasing in current durables consumption
due to supply bolenecks, and decreasing in planned future durables consumption. e laer
is due to the fact that the higher is future durables consumption, the more current consumption
lowers the future investment cost by increasing the stock carried over to the next period.
Supply bolenecks (i) increase the ratio of nondurables consumption to durables con-
sumption in every period, (ii) increase the steady-state ratio of nondurables consumption to
durables consumption (unless δ = 0), and (iii) smooth the adjustment of durables consumption
in response to revenue shocks. e stock of durables will not immediately jump to its new
level when grant revenue changes. As a result, the total spending response to the permanent
grant shock will be less front-loaded than in the baseline case. On the other hand, the lumpi-
ness constraint may limit the degree to which the government can smooth the adjustment of
durables.
A.1.2 Liquidity Constraints
Second, district governments may be liquidity constrained. Indeed, since decentralization
was enacted, lending to district governments has been minimal (World Bank, 2007, p. 128).
Liquidity constraints would lead to lower government spending in all periods—both when the
constraints bind and when they do not. is is because the prospect of liquidity constraints
binding in the future lowers current consumption (Zeldes, 1989).
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In theory, liquidity constraints should also inﬂuence how governments respond to revenue
shocks. In a simple model of consumption, liquidity constraints raise the marginal propensity
to consume (MPC) and cause the MPC to be higher for small income shocks than for large
income shocks. Liquidity constraints also lead to a higher MPC for negative income shocks
than for positive income shocks (Christelis, Georgarakos, Jappelli, Pistaferri, and van Rooij,
2019). is asymmetric response implies that district governments should react more strongly
to oil and gas revenue than to the general grant, biasing the results away from the predictions
of the model with lumpy investment.
In practice, district governments accumulated substantial reserves in the years immediately
following decentralization, suggesting that liquidity constraints were not a signiﬁcant issue
during most of the sample period. Reserves were especially high for the districts that beneﬁted
the most from the general grant and the oil and gas revenue, and hence were most exposed to
the grant shocks (World Bank, 2007, p. 127). Figure A.3 shows that reserves per capita were
much higher in the oil-and-gas-rich provinces of Kalimantan Timur, Riau, and Kepulauan Riau
than in other provinces. e provinces of Kalimantan Tengah and Kepulauan Bangka-Belitung
also had signiﬁcant reserves, having beneﬁted from a generous allocation of the general grant.
It therefore seems reasonable to assume that liquidity constraints were not binding for the
districts that experienced the largest shocks to the two grants.
A.1.3 Uncertainty
ird, districts may face uncertainty about future grant revenue. is would create a demand for
precautionary saving, lowering current consumption relative to expected future consumption
(Leland, 1968).30 Whether the precautionary-saving motive inﬂuences how the government
responds to a grant-revenue shock depends on how the shock aﬀects the overall risk faced
by the government. In a model in which the government can tax private income at any
rate, Vegh and Vuletin (2015) show that the government’s spending response to a permanent
positive shock to grant revenue is larger, the weaker is the correlation between grant revenue
and private income. e reason is that the shock increases the grant share of total income,
which is assumed to be less than one half, diversifying the government’s “portfolio.”31 e
diversiﬁcation eﬀect is probably less relevant for Indonesia, where district governments cannot
set tax rates on income and property. e central government sets and administers these taxes
and rebates a portion back to the district. On average shared tax revenue accounts for only 11
percent of the district budget, and own-source revenue from business license fees, hotel and
restaurant taxes, and utility fees accounts for nine percent of the budget. By contrast, grant
revenue accounts for at least 71 percent of the district budget on average (World Bank, 2007,
p. 120). In the Indonesian context a permanent increase in uncertain grant revenue may very
30at is, assuming the utility function has strictly positive third derivatives.
31e authors do not consider transitory shocks, though they claim that their main results would not change if
shocks were assumed to be temporary.
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well increase the total risk of public revenue, reducing the marginal propensity to spend out of
public resources.
A.2 Details on the General Grant Reform
From 2002–2005 the expenditure-needs formula was
AvдExp · (0.4 · PopIndexd + 0.1 · PovGapIndexd + 0.1 · AreaIndexd + 0.4 ·CostIndexd),
where AvдExp is average expenditure of all district governments, PopIndexd is the population
of districtd divided by average district population, and the other indices are deﬁned analogously.
Starting in 2006, the formula was
AvдExp · (0.3 · PopIndexd + 0.1 · 1/HDId + 0.15 ·GDPIndexd
+0.15 · AreaIndexd + 0.3 ·CostIndexd),
where HDI stands for Human Development Index. e expenditure-needs formula changed in
three ways. First, AvдExp increased as a result of the budget expansion. Second, the poverty
gap index was replaced by the (inverse of) the human development index and the regional
GDP per capita index.32 is change had lile eﬀect on equalization (World Bank, 2007). ird,
the weights of the population, area, and cost indices changed. In particular, greater weight
was giving to less densely populated districts. Rural districts tend to be poorer than urban
districts in Indonesia. As a result, in 2006 the general grant increased for most districts, and the
increase was much larger for poor, rural districts (World Bank, 2007). Furthermore, the policy
change was persistent, as the expenditure-needs formula changed very lile from 2006–2011
(Shah et al., 2012).33 Holding ﬁxed the Basic Allocation and Fiscal Capacity, the change in the
per capita general grant allocation to district d from 2005 to 2006 is given by
GenGrantd,06
Popd,06
−
GenGrantd,05
Popd,05
=
(
0.3 ·
AvдExp06
AvдPop06
− 0.4 ·
AvдExp05
AvдPop05
)
+
(
0.15 ·
AvдExp06
AvдArea
·
Aread
Popd,06
− 0.1 ·
AvдExp05
AvдArea
·
Aread
Popd,05
)
+
(
0.3 ·
AvдExp06
Popd,06
·
Costd,06
AvдCost06
− 0.4 ·
AvдExp05
Popd,05
·
Costd,05
AvдCost05
)
+
(
0.1 ·
AvдExp06
Popd,06
·
1
HDId,06
+ 0.15 ·
AvдExp06
Popd,06
·
GDPd,06
AvдGDP06
− 0.1 ·
AvдExp05
Popd,05
·
PovGapd,05
AvдPovGap05
)
.
32e laer index is the regional GDP per capita relative to the average district GDP per capita.
33In 2010 and 2011 the weight on the area index changed to 0.1325 and 0.135, respectively, and the weights on
the inverse HDI index and the GDP index increased slightly.
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A useful approximation to the above expression obtains under the assumption of zero district
population growth, zero change in the relative cost of construction across districts, and zero
change in the relative poverty gap across districts.34 Under these assumptions, the change in
per capita general grant allocation can be expressed in terms of the total general grant budgets
in 2005 and 2006 and district characteristics measured in 2006:
GenGrantd,06
Popd,06
−
GenGrantd,05
Popd,05
≈
(0.3 · AvдExp06 − 0.4 · AvдExp05)
AvдPop06
+
(0.15 · AvдExp06 − 0.1 · AvдExp05)
AvдArea
·
Aread
Popd,06
+
(0.3 · AvдExp06 − 0.4 · AvдExp05)
Popd,06
·
Costd,06
AvдCost06
+
(
0.1 ·
AvдExp06
Popd,06
·
1
HDId,06
+ 0.15 ·
AvдExp06
Popd,06
·
GDPd,06
AvдGDP06
− 0.1 ·
AvдExp05
Popd,06
·
PovGapd,06
AvдPovGap06
)
.
e second term on the right-hand side accounts for a large fraction of the cross-district
variation in the general grant allocation change. e quantity (0.15 ·AvдExp06−0.1 ·AvдExp05)
is large and positive due to the overall general grant budget increase. is term is scaled by
relative area per capita, Aread/(AvдArea · Popd,06). e change in general grant revenue
received by district d from 2005 to 2006 can be approximated as
GenGrantd,06
Popd,06
−
GenGrantd,05
Popd,05
≈ θ + π
Aread
Popd,06
+ Remainderd .
e above expression yields the approximate change in general grant revenue per capita for
districts for which the reform to the expenditure-needs formula was binding. e formula
dictated that districts rich in natural resources, which had substantial “ﬁscal capacity” according
to the formula, should have experienced a decline in general grant revenue over this period.
Instead, a hold-harmless provision froze the general grant amount for such districts over this
period.
A.3 Magnitude of Grant Shocks
Figure A.4 displays histograms of the absolute two-year change in revenue for each of the two
grants. I use two-year changes instead of one-year changes to account for the small amount of
persistence in the oil and gas revenue shocks. e general grant shock is measured over the
period 2005–2007, while the oil and gas revenue shock is measured over all two-year periods,
starting with 2001–2003. Panel (a) shows the results for the entire sample of districts. Both
34District annual population growth averaged 1.3 percent over the sample period, andmedian annual population
growth was 1.4 percent.
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shocks are skewed to the right, and the skew is greater for the oil and gas revenue. e mean
of the general grant shock (0.54) greatly exceeds the mean of the oil and gas revenue shock
(0.07), which is unsurprising as only a small fraction of districts receive signiﬁcant amounts of
oil and gas revenue.
e empirical results will, to a great degree, reﬂect the responses of a subsample of districts
that are highly exposed to the grant shocks. It is therefore useful to consider the distribution
of grant shocks for these districts. Panel (b) displays the general grant shock histogram for
districts exceeding the 75th percentile of land area per capita in 2006 and not located in oil-and-
gas-rich provinces, as well as the oil and gas revenue shock histogram for districts exceeding
the 95th percentile in oil and gas endowment. For these two subsamples, the mean of the
general grant shock (1.11) is very similar to the mean of the oil and gas revenue shock (1.03).
e conﬁdence interval for the general grant shock even includes the mean of the oil and
gas revenue shock. (Note, however, that the rightward skew is still greater for the oil and
gas revenue shock.) us, the per-period value of shocks to the general grant and oil and gas
revenue are reasonably similar for districts with signiﬁcant exposure to the shocks.
A.4 Time-Series Properties of the Grants
Institutional details and graphical evidence indicate that over-time variation in the general
grant is dominated by a single permanent shock, while over-time variation in the oil and gas
revenue is dominated by transitory shocks. is subsection compares the time-series properties
of the two grants in a more rigorous fashion by employing two quantitative measures: volatility
and persistence.
First, I measure the volatility of each grant using the within-district coeﬃcient of variation,
deﬁned as the within-district sample standard deviation divided by the overall sample mean.35
e working hypothesis is that the oil and gas revenue is more volatile than the general grant.
e within-district coeﬃcient of variation of the oil and gas revenue (1.465) is 4.5 times greater
than that of the general grant (0.317), conﬁrming that the oil and gas revenue is signiﬁcantly
more volatile than the general grant.
Next, I estimate the persistence of each grant over time using autoregressions. In principle
one could apply time-series estimators to aggregate values of the two grants. However, because
the dataset contains few time periods (14 years) and many districts, a dynamic panel model is
more appropriate. I specify the model
Grantdit =
J∑
j=1
αjGrantdi,t−j + ηd +ψit + νdit (A.2)
35Formally, deﬁne the within-district sample variance as S˜x =
∑
d
∑
t (xdt − xd ·)
2/(N − D), where xd · =∑
t xdt/Td ,Td is the number of time periods observed for district d , N =
∑
d Td is the total number of observations,
and D is the number of districts. Deﬁne the overall sample mean as x =
∑
d
∑
t xdt/N . en the within-district
coeﬃcient of variation is
√
S˜x/x .
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separately for each grant variable, where ηd is a district ﬁxed eﬀect andψit is an island-by-year
eﬀect. e sum of the autoregressive coeﬃcients,
∑J
j=1 αj , indicates the persistence of the
process. e working hypothesis is that the general grant is more persistent than the oil and
gas revenue.
Table A.1 presents estimates of the coeﬃcients in equation (A.2) for J = 1 and J = 3. Panel
A presents the results for the general grant, and Panel B presents the results for the oil and
gas revenue. For both grants we reject the presence of a unit root.36 Columns 1 and 2 report
“OLS levels” estimates that account for island-by-year eﬀects but do not account for district
ﬁxed eﬀects. Estimated persistence is biased upwards due to the positive correlation between
ηd and lags of Grant (Bond, 2002). erefore, one may view the estimates as an upper bound
on the true persistence (asymptotically). Estimated persistence of the general grant ranges
from 0.997 to 1.018, while estimated persistence of the oil and gas revenue ranges from 0.883
to 0.938. us, the general grant appears to be more persistent than the oil and gas revenue,
however these estimates are likely to be substantially biased.
Columns 3 and 4 report the “within-groups” estimates—commonly called “ﬁxed-eﬀects”
estimates—which account for island-by-year eﬀects and district ﬁxed eﬀects. Estimated per-
sistence is biased downwards due to the negative correlation between, e.g., the transformed
Grantdi,t−1 and the transformed νdit (Bond, 2002). is asymptotic bias is of order 1/T , where
T is the number of time periods, so the bias declines as the number of time periods grows
(Nickell, 1981). Still, the bias is likely to be non-negligible with T = 14. erefore, one may
view the within-groups estimates as a lower bound on the true persistence (asymptotically).
Estimated persistence of the general grant ranges from 0.537 to 0.569, and these estimates
are quite precise. e persistence of the oil and gas revenue is lower, ranging from 0.067
to 0.237, where the former estimate is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Overall, the
general grant appears to be much more persistent than the oil and gas revenue, according to
the within-groups estimates, which are likely to be biased downwards for both grants.
Columns 5 and 6 present system GMM estimates, which deal with Nickell bias and are
consistent as the number of districts grows and the number of time periods is ﬁxed.37 According
to these estimates, the persistence of the general grant ranges from 0.934 to 0.958. e point
estimates for the persistence of the oil and gas revenue are very small, albeit imprecise, ranging
from 0.007 to 0.143. us, the GMM estimates of the persistence of the oil and gas revenue fall
below the within-groups estimates, however both GMM estimates are very imprecise. While
no single estimate of persistence in Table A.1 is without ﬂaw, all three estimators point to the
same conclusion: the general grant is more persistent than the oil and gas revenue.38
36is result is based on the unit-root test by Harris and Tzavalis (1999), which assumes persistence is the same
across panels and is valid for a ﬁxed number of time periods. We are also able to reject the presence of a unit root
in expenditure. (Results available upon request.)
37System GMM was developed by Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano
and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998). I follow the recommendations of Roodman (2009) and Bazzi and
Clemens (2013) and “collapse” the instrument matrix to avoid the problem of many weak instruments.
38One may also estimate an AR(1) model, Yt = α + βYt−1 +Ut , where Yt is average revenue per capita in year t .
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How does the empirical persistence of the grants compare to the persistence of the the-
oretical grant revenue series presented in Section 2? e theoretical series that experienced
the permanent shock has a persistence of one, and the theoretical series that experienced the
transitory shock has a persistence of zero.39 e results in Table A.1 indicate that the persis-
tence of the general grant is below, and possibly close to, one. e results are less informative
for the oil and gas revenue, due to the imprecision of the GMM estimates. Nonetheless, the
downward-biased within-groups estimates indicate that the persistence of the oil and gas
revenue is signiﬁcantly greater than zero. e diﬀerence in the actual persistence of the two
grants is not quite as stark as what was presented in the theoretical model. It would therefore
be unsurprising if the diﬀerence in the responses to the two grants were slightly less stark
than the predictions of the model.
e diﬀerence in persistence of the two grants is large in this model as well, with or without bias corrections for
the small number of time periods. (ese results are available upon request.)
39To see this, consider the model Yt = α + βYt−1 + Ut with Ut = 0 deterministically. Calculate β =
Cov(Yt ,Yt−1)/V(Yt−1) for two series, Y
′
t = (. . . , 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, . . .) and Y
′′
t = (. . . , 0, 0, 1, 0, 0 . . .). It is straight-
forward to show that β = 1 for the ﬁrst series and β = 0 for the second series.
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A.5 Tables
Table A.1: Persistence of Grant Revenue over Time
Panel A: General Grant p.c.
OLS Levels Within Groups System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lag 1 0.995∗∗∗ 0.864∗∗∗ 0.569∗∗∗ 0.512∗∗∗ 0.934∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗
(0.013) (0.071) (0.036) (0.058) (0.085) (0.147)
Lag 2 0.101 0.013 0.577∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.058) (0.139)
Lag 3 0.051 0.011 0.017
(0.083) (0.061) (0.077)
Persistence 0.995 1.016 0.569 0.536 0.934 0.959
(0.013) (0.013) (0.036) (0.056) (0.085) (0.027)
AR(2) test p-value 0.832 0.423
Observations 4,885 4,635 4,885 4,635 4,885 4,635
District clusters 372 372 372 372 372 372
Prov. × year clusters 384 384 384 384 384 384
p-value, H0: unit root 0.000
Within coef. of var. 0.318
Panel B: Oil & Gas Revenue p.c.
OLS Levels Within Groups System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lag 1 0.883∗∗∗ 0.591∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ 0.176 −0.047
(0.040) (0.094) (0.079) (0.066) (0.627) (0.491)
Lag 2 0.203∗∗ −0.027 0.201
(0.097) (0.105) (0.293)
Lag 3 0.144 −0.128 −0.188
(0.099) (0.087) (0.360)
Persistence 0.883 0.938 0.238 0.069 0.176 −0.033
(0.040) (0.061) (0.079) (0.181) (0.627) (0.843)
AR(2) test p-value 0.995 0.984
Observations 4,885 4,635 4,885 4,635 4,885 4,635
District clusters 372 372 372 372 372 372
Prov. × year clusters 384 384 384 384 384 384
p-value, H0: unit root 0.000
Within coef. of var. 1.468
Notes. is table shows results from regressing each grant variable on its lags. Panel A presents results for the
general grant, and Panel B presents results for oil and gas revenue. Each regression includes a full set of island ×
year dummies. Columns 1 and 2 present pooled OLS estimates which do not account for district ﬁxed eﬀects.
Columns 3 and 4 present “within groups” (or “ﬁxed-eﬀects”) estimates which account for district ﬁxed eﬀects.
Columns 5 and 6 present system GMM estimates which account for district ﬁxed eﬀects and dynamic panel
bias. “Persistence” is deﬁned as the sum of the lag coeﬃcients. e AR(2) test p-value corresponds to the null
hypothesis of zero serial correlation in the error term. Each panel reports the result of the Harris and Tzavalis
(1999) unit-root test, as well as the “within” coeﬃcient of variation, deﬁned as the within-district sample standard
deviation divided by the sample mean. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity
and two-way clustering by district and province × year. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.2: Expenditure Responses by Economic Classiﬁcation (OLS)
Cumulative Response: Expenditure per Capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Capital Goods & Services Personnel Other
General Grant p.c.
0 Years later 0.89∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.04
(0.12) (0.10) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03)
1 Year later 0.85∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ −0.09
(0.17) (0.10) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07)
2 Years later 1.19∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.11 0.39∗∗∗ −0.05
(0.24) (0.12) (0.08) (0.07) (0.04)
3 Years later 0.93∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.11 0.46∗∗∗ −0.05
(0.21) (0.11) (0.07) (0.09) (0.05)
Oil & Gas Revenue p.c.
0 Years later 0.48∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.10 0.08 0.10∗
(0.22) (0.05) (0.09) (0.07) (0.05)
1 Year later 0.92∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.16
(0.27) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10)
2 Years later 1.45∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.28∗
(0.29) (0.06) (0.11) (0.09) (0.15)
3 Years later 1.61∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗
(0.38) (0.07) (0.15) (0.08) (0.15)
Test: Equal responses, 0 years 0.162 0.050 0.910 0.018 0.404
Test: Equal responses, 1 year 0.856 0.285 0.528 0.200 0.045
Test: Equal responses, 2 years 0.543 0.027 0.181 0.522 0.048
Test: Equal responses, 3 years 0.208 0.930 0.117 0.796 0.043
Test: Equal responses, all years 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.168
Observations 3,590 3,630 3,630 3,640 3,596
District clusters 372 372 372 372 372
Prov. × year clusters 306 306 306 306 306
Notes. is table reports OLS estimates of the cumulative spending responses aer S years, derived from (2), to
the general grant (
∑S
k=0 βk ) and oil and gas revenue (
∑S
k=0 δk ). Each regression includes a full set of district and
island × year dummies. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and two-way
clustering by district and province × year. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.3: Expenditure Responses by Function (OLS)
Cumulative Response: Expenditure per Capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Education Administration Infrastructure Health Agriculture
General Grant p.c.
0 Years later 0.17∗∗∗ 0.16 0.36∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.12) (0.12) (0.02) (0.01)
1 Year later 0.26∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.12) (0.13) (0.02) (0.01)
2 Years later 0.27∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.13) (0.12) (0.03) (0.02)
3 Years later 0.29∗∗∗ 0.21∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.12) (0.13) (0.03) (0.02)
Oil & Gas Revenue p.c.
0 Years later 0.08∗∗ 0.27∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.03 0.02∗
(0.04) (0.15) (0.10) (0.03) (0.01)
1 Year later 0.15∗∗ 0.34 0.45∗∗∗ 0.06 0.05∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.26) (0.13) (0.05) (0.01)
2 Years later 0.28∗∗∗ 0.46 0.65∗∗∗ 0.09 0.06∗∗
(0.07) (0.34) (0.11) (0.07) (0.03)
3 Years later 0.39∗∗∗ 0.81∗ 0.94∗∗∗ 0.13 0.09∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.45) (0.15) (0.09) (0.03)
Test: Equal responses, 0 years 0.149 0.470 0.026 0.459 0.256
Test: Equal responses, 1 year 0.318 0.771 0.372 0.464 0.098
Test: Equal responses, 2 years 0.870 0.661 0.455 0.894 0.432
Test: Equal responses, 3 years 0.452 0.255 0.000 0.690 0.663
Test: Equal responses, all years 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002
Observations 2,893 2,948 2,893 2,892 2,879
District clusters 372 372 372 372 372
Prov. × year clusters 249 249 249 249 249
Notes. is table reports OLS estimates of the cumulative spending responses aer S years, derived from (2), to
the general grant (
∑S
k=0 βk ) and oil and gas revenue (
∑S
k=0 δk ). Each regression includes a full set of district and
island × year dummies. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and two-way
clustering by district and province × year. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.4: Expenditure Share Responses by Economic Classiﬁcation (OLS)
Cumulative Response: Expenditure Share (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capital Goods & Services Personnel Other
General Grant p.c.
0 Years later 0.01 −0.77∗ 0.25 0.02
(0.82) (0.42) (0.73) (0.42)
1 Year later −0.15 0.11 0.31 −0.90∗
(1.01) (0.46) (0.90) (0.48)
2 Years later 1.18 −1.28∗∗ 0.28 −1.34∗∗
(1.14) (0.57) (1.06) (0.52)
3 Years later −0.28 −0.24 0.96 −0.35
(1.30) (0.59) (1.02) (0.62)
Oil & Gas Revenue p.c.
0 Years later 0.64 −0.56 0.05 0.07
(0.57) (0.35) (0.48) (0.18)
1 Year later −1.55∗∗ 0.05 1.00 0.09
(0.67) (0.29) (0.64) (0.34)
2 Years later −2.09∗∗ −0.05 0.92 0.73
(1.02) (0.38) (1.01) (0.56)
3 Years later −2.68∗∗ 0.50 1.18 1.10∗∗
(1.10) (0.45) (1.32) (0.50)
Test: Equal responses, 0 years 0.519 0.701 0.812 0.912
Test: Equal responses, 1 year 0.216 0.916 0.516 0.099
Test: Equal responses, 2 years 0.016 0.060 0.611 0.005
Test: Equal responses, 3 years 0.106 0.207 0.877 0.019
Test: Equal responses, all years 0.029 0.107 0.880 0.077
Observations 3,577 3,576 3,586 3,542
District clusters 372 372 372 372
Prov. × year clusters 306 306 306 306
Notes. is table reports OLS estimates of the cumulative spending responses aer S years, derived from (2), to
the general grant (
∑S
k=0 βk ) and oil and gas revenue (
∑S
k=0 δk ). Each regression includes a full set of district and
island × year dummies. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and two-way
clustering by district and province × year. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.5: Expenditure Share Responses by Function (OLS)
Cumulative Response: Expenditure Share (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Education Administration Infrastructure Health Agriculture
General Grant p.c.
0 Years later −0.01 −2.62∗∗ 1.72∗ −0.52∗∗ −0.05
(0.63) (1.27) (0.92) (0.25) (0.18)
1 Year later 1.45∗ −2.58∗ 2.02∗ 0.02 0.05
(0.84) (1.57) (1.03) (0.29) (0.22)
2 Years later 1.04 −1.08 1.44 −0.03 0.03
(0.89) (1.61) (1.32) (0.36) (0.22)
3 Years later 0.20 −0.06 2.01 −0.17 0.06
(0.80) (1.63) (1.36) (0.35) (0.19)
Oil & Gas Revenue p.c.
0 Years later 0.12 −0.10 −0.28 −0.25∗∗ −0.04
(0.41) (0.55) (0.84) (0.11) (0.07)
1 Year later 0.91 −0.08 −0.27 −0.18 −0.02
(0.92) (0.87) (1.13) (0.25) (0.10)
2 Years later 1.42 −1.20 0.38 −0.40 −0.07
(1.12) (1.78) (1.95) (0.39) (0.20)
3 Years later 1.59 −0.05 1.83 −0.43 −0.00
(1.71) (1.93) (2.02) (0.44) (0.22)
Test: Equal responses, 0 years 0.831 0.088 0.092 0.309 0.962
Test: Equal responses, 1 year 0.608 0.156 0.171 0.600 0.750
Test: Equal responses, 2 years 0.768 0.966 0.702 0.488 0.649
Test: Equal responses, 3 years 0.422 0.995 0.950 0.598 0.794
Test: Equal responses, all years 0.640 0.194 0.045 0.346 0.982
Observations 2,680 2,735 2,680 2,679 2,666
District clusters 372 372 372 372 372
Prov. × year clusters 249 249 249 249 249
Notes. is table reports OLS estimates of the cumulative spending responses aer S years, derived from (2), to
the general grant (
∑S
k=0 βk ) and oil and gas revenue (
∑S
k=0 δk ). Each regression includes a full set of district and
island × year dummies. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and two-way
clustering by district and province × year. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.6: Flypaper Eﬀect
Total Expenditure per Capita
(1) (2)
OLS 2SLS
General Grant p.c. 0.808∗∗∗ 0.397
(0.193) (2.451)
Lag 1 0.271 0.847
(0.184) (2.106)
Lag 2 0.179 0.569
(0.268) (0.713)
Lag 3 −0.214 −0.432
(0.242) (0.350)
Oil & Gas Revenue p.c. 0.640∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗
(0.207) (0.167)
Lag 1 0.578∗∗∗ 0.571
(0.179) (0.665)
Lag 2 0.538∗∗∗ 0.344
(0.206) (0.501)
Lag 3 0.379∗∗∗ 0.149
(0.119) (0.180)
Non-Oil/Gas GDP p.c. 0.005 0.012
(0.006) (0.021)
Lag 1 0.002 −0.006
(0.006) (0.023)
Lag 2 0.000 −0.004
(0.006) (0.018)
Lag 3 0.001 0.006
(0.008) (0.013)
Oil/Gas GDP p.c. 0.010∗∗ 0.007∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Lag 1 −0.018∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗
(0.005) (0.008)
Lag 2 0.001 0.004
(0.002) (0.003)
Lag 3 −0.001 0.000
(0.004) (0.006)
Coef. sum: General Grant p.c. 1.044 1.381
(0.196) (0.898)
Coef. sum: Oil & Gas Revenue p.c. 2.135 1.423
(0.526) (0.663)
Coef. sum: Non-Oil/Gas GDP p.c. 0.009 0.008
(0.008) (0.009)
Coef. sum: Oil/Gas GDP p.c. −0.008 −0.006
(0.005) (0.009)
Test: equal sums, Gen. Grant & Non-Oil/Gas GDP 0.000 0.127
Test: equal sums, Gen. Grant & Oil/Gas GDP 0.000 0.128
Test: equal sums, Oil & Gas Rev. & Non-Oil/Gas GDP 0.000 0.032
Test: equal sums, Oil & Gas Rev. & Oil/Gas GDP 0.000 0.031
Observations 3,214 3,214
District clusters 372 372
Prov. × year clusters 278 278
Notes. Each regression includes a full set of district and island × year dummies. Standard errors, reported in
parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and two-way clustering by district and province × year. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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A.6 Figures
Figure A.1: Oil and Gas Production and Prices
(a) Total Oil and Gas Production
35
0
40
0
45
0
50
0
55
0
To
tal
 Pr
od
uc
tio
n (
Mi
llio
n b
bl)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Year
Oil Gas
(b) World Oil and Gas Prices
20
0
40
0
60
0
80
0
10
00
Wo
rld
 Pr
ice
 (T
ho
us
an
d I
DR
/bb
l)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Year
Oil Gas
Notes. Panel (a) plots total production of oil (solid line) and gas (dashed line) in barrels of oil equivalent (millions).
Panel (b) plots the Brent oil price (solid line) and the Nymex gas price (dashed line) in constant 2010 IDR
(thousands) per barrel of oil equivalent.
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Figure A.4: Distribution of Grant-Revenue Shocks
(a) All Districts
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(b) Districts with High Exposure to Grant Shocks
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Notes. Each panel displays two histograms of the absolute two-year change in grant revenue: one for the general
grant over the period 2005–2007, and another for the oil and gas revenue over all years. Panel (a) uses the entire
sample of districts, and Panel (b) uses the subsample of districts that were highly exposed to the grant shocks.
e general grant histogram in Panel (b) is for districts exceeding the 75th percentile of land area per capita in
2006 and not located in oil-and-gas-rich provinces. e oil and gas revenue histogram in Panel (b) is for districts
exceeding the 95th percentile in oil and gas endowment. Revenue is expressed in constant 2010 IDR per capita
(millions).
65
Figure A.5: Oil and Gas Fields of Indonesia
Notes. in gray lines indicate district borders, thick black lines indicate province borders, and yellow dots
indicate oil and gas ﬁelds. Data on oil and gas ﬁelds come from Rystad Energy.
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